

National Institute for Deterrence Studies & Peter Huessy Seminar

Hollywood vs. Reality: Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of “Dynamite” and “Oppenheimer”

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Webinar Transcript

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Abstract

This seminar, hosted by the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), critically examines the influence of Hollywood on public understanding of nuclear deterrence. Through an in-depth discussion led by Peter Huessy and Dr. Adam Lowther, the session explores how films such as *Oppenheimer* and *Dynamite* distort strategic realities, misrepresent decision-making processes, and perpetuate myths about U.S. nuclear policy.

The conversation highlights the historical evolution of deterrence, the technological advancements that underpin credibility, and the dangers posed by narratives that undermine confidence in national security. By contrasting cinematic fiction with operational facts, the seminar underscores the enduring role of nuclear deterrence in preventing large-scale conflict and maintaining global stability.

This event serves as a call to action for defense professionals and policymakers to engage in accurate public education, counter misinformation, and reinforce the strategic logic that has safeguarded peace for over eight decades.

Executive Summary

The National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) hosted a seminar examining how Hollywood narratives influence public perceptions of nuclear deterrence and the risks these misconceptions pose to national security. Led by Peter Huessy and Dr. Adam Lowther, the

discussion contrasted cinematic portrayals with real-world deterrence principles and operational realities.

Key Themes & Insights

- **Hollywood's Narrative vs. Reality:** Films like *Oppenheimer* and *Dynamite* dramatize nuclear decision-making, often depicting U.S. leadership as inept and deterrence as fragile. These portrayals ignore decades of proven stability and rigorous safeguards.
- **Historical Context:** The seminar highlighted pivotal developments—from the H-bomb and Minuteman missile programs to modern missile defense—that underpin credible deterrence and prevent large-scale war.
- **Persistent Myths:** Popular media perpetuates outdated concepts like Mutual Assured Destruction and underplays technological advancements in early warning systems and missile defense.
- **Strategic Risks of Misrepresentation:** False narratives erode public confidence, fuel abolitionist agendas, and obscure the reality that nuclear deterrence has dramatically reduced global warfare and casualties since 1945.
- **Call to Action:** Experts urged the defense community to engage proactively—correcting misinformation, educating policymakers, and shaping accurate public discourse.

Why It Matters Nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of U.S. national security. Misunderstanding its role and effectiveness can lead to misguided policies, weakening strategic stability at a time of growing threats from Russia, China, and rogue states.

Unabridged Transcript

(Note: there will invariably be some word errors in the following AI generated transcript.)

00;00;05;23 - 00;00;33;08

Kimberly Cherington

Good morning. I'm Kimberly Cherington, and on behalf of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, or NIDS, it's my pleasure to welcome you to today's seminar, *Hollywood versus Reality Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Dynamite and Oppenheimer*, with our own Peter Huessy and Dr. Adam Lowther. Next Friday we have, Dr. James Petrosky, Curtis McGiffiin, and Kirk Fansher. That's December 12th.

00;00;33;15 - 00;01;04;27

Kimberly Cherington

For an in-depth discussion on our NIDS latest research insights with a proposed Nuclear Posture Review for 2026. Don't miss that one! On December 19th, Join us for *Strategic Perspective on Nuclear moderated with Dave Hoagland*, Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at DOE. If you'd like to explore more of our work, including upcoming

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00;01;05;04 - 00;01;36;07

Kimberly Cherington

We're constantly adding newsletters and content, so be sure to check back often and follow us on social media to stay informed. If you or your colleagues would like future invitations directly coming to your email, just email me at KCherington@Thinkdeterrence.com and I will get you on the invite list. Throughout today's presentation, we encourage you to submit your questions in the Q&A button at the top of your screen or right in the chat.

00;01;36;09 - 00;01;59;18

Kimberly Cherington

We will address them during the Q&A portion of the seminar. Now, I'm delighted to introduce our host for today's discussion and also the guest for today's discussion, the admired Mr. Peter Huessy, President and Senior Director of Strategic Deterrence Studies at Geo Strategic Analysis and a senior fellow here at NIDS. Peter, the floor is yours.

00;01;59;21 - 00;02;20;17

Peter Huessy

Thank you very much, Kimberly. And I want to welcome our guests. We have a little over 90 signed up, which I want to thank everybody, particularly those here who are our sponsors. And I want to welcome our president, Jim Petrosky, who's joining us today, and our vice president, my colleague at Adam Lowtherr, who is calling and talking to us from the sands of Saudi Arabia.

00;02;20;23 - 00;02;55;16

Peter Huessy

I'm looking outside here and seeing snow. So, it's quite a contrast. But the, my remarks today are on Mr. Oppenheimer, the movie Oppenheimer, the book by Annie Sorensen on nuclear war and *Dynamite*. The recent movie which talks about an attack on the United States. And what I'm calling it is blowing up nuclear deterrence and protection is what these three elements have tried to do, because what they want to do is scrap nuclear deterrence for abolition, but they don't tell us how to get to abolition.

00;02;55;19 - 00;03;19;28

Peter Huessy

Number one. And number two, what we do in the interim, in fact, any Sorensen, when asked about current nuclear deterrence, said it's mad. And she wasn't talking about mutual assured destruction. She said it matters in crazy. And she said you need to get rid of it. Let's walk back a little bit about Oppenheimer. There's a major, major issue that is completely lost in the Oppenheimer movie.

00;03;20;01 - 00;03;45;19

Peter Huessy

One is that the H-bomb was developed and tested by the Atomic Energy Commission, and it allowed us to build very small warheads that were very, very powerful. Which means guess what? After Sputnik, when Bernie Schriever and others were told, go build us some submarines or ICBMs, we could put these small warheads on the SLB of missiles and they could fit within a submarine, which at the time people thought was crazy.

00;03;45;21 - 00;04;25;02

Peter Huessy

But I believe it. Over a period of three and a half or four years, we developed the submarine system, and we developed Minuteman by 1962, which was five years later after Sputnik. And it was an extraordinary achievement at the time, of which we did not know we could get there. So given that we now know Sputnik went up in 57, and we were terribly worried that we would cut with the Russians being able to orbit nuclear weapons in space, and we would only have bombers in our nuclear deterrent, or large liquid fueled ICBMs that were easily targeted because they were barely above ground and so forth.

00;04;25;02 - 00;04;57;02

Peter Huessy

So, any source and, so gotta give Edward Teller enormous credit for allowing us to have a submarine fleet and an ICBM fleet that was relatively cheap to build, believe it or not, and survivable and an assured second strike that was extraordinarily important for maintaining deterrence. Now, what about Annie Sorenson? Very briefly. She has North Korea launched at the United States.

00;04;57;04 - 00;05;08;11

Peter Huessy

One rocket on Washington, DC and one warhead on a nuclear power plant in California and the United States. Thinking that this is.

00;05;08;13 - 00;05;30;27

Peter Huessy

A bigger attack launches a huge attack on North Korea over the pole, which the Russians think is that them the Russians in turn, launch everything at us. And whatever we have left, we launch back at them. Nuclear winter is created, billions of people die. And that's why Annie Sorensen comes up with the idea that this really doesn't make any sense, and it's too dangerous of a strategy to have.

00;05;30;27 - 00;06;07;23

Peter Huessy

And so that's her book. And what's interesting is missile defense doesn't even come into play in her book. So, what about *Dynamite*? They make an enormous number of mistakes. They made false assumptions, so they were careless with the data. Give me one example. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, both our radars and our global protection system or satellites have worked for 80 years telling us where there was a launch of a ballistic missile somewhere, which we didn't know was coming, like an announcement of a test launcher, announcement of a scientific launch like the Norwegian sounding rocket.

00;06;07;25 - 00;06;37;10

Peter Huessy

And yet this movie dynamite assumes that for the first time, our GPS system won't work. And it works. It won't work exactly. At the time that some bad guy somewhere decides to launch one nuclear weapon at us in one missile. We don't know where the missile comes from. And therefore, the procedure that we would do, which is you have a launch conference where we convene a group and said, where's the launch?

00;06;37;17 - 00;06;57;25

Peter Huessy

Where'd it come from? Do we know what country? Do we know where it's going? Once you do that procedure, you then can go and go to the next step, which is what options should we tell the president of the United States that he or she have with respect to responding? We have never had a launch conference. Never. Why?

00;06;57;28 - 00;07;29;12

Peter Huessy

Because our deterrent works, number one. And number two, our satellite system will know where something comes from. And the bad guys will know that. Oops. They figure out where who launched this and will be toast because the United States will retaliate against us. So, the movie dynamite gives us a process that doesn't even exist. They supposedly get the desks right at a Stratcom meeting, and they get the desk right in the, Situation Room in the White House.

00;07;29;15 - 00;07;53;12

Peter Huessy

And supposedly those details and a lot of people are saying, oh, boy, they must have talked to some people. Well, whomever they talked to they listed are people that are almost all in favor of abolition and or big arms controllers and know people that really have done this for a living. And it's really strange. The satellite fails exactly when someone as much as a missile at the United States.

00;07;53;14 - 00;08;15;17

Peter Huessy

Now, who's going to take that risk? And then all of a sudden, the satellite comes back on and it tracks the warhead toward Chicago with one warhead. We don't know whether it's nuclear. We don't know, what's in it, but why would anybody take such a risk? But you have to design a story and rig the system so you come out with what you want.

00;08;15;17 - 00;08;42;16

Peter Huessy

Which I'll get to in a minute. There is one option we have when the missiles coming at us, and that is shoot it down. And Neil Oppenheim, the writer, the scriptwriter, says even though he acknowledges we have at least a 60% success rate for interceptors, and actually we have 100% in the last four tests of all worked, he decides that one of our interceptors from Alaska will not work.

00;08;42;19 - 00;09;07;11

Peter Huessy

What do we get out of silo? And two the second one misses. As my colleague Adam has pointed out, we would probably use more than two of the four interceptors. And if there's a 60% success rate as Oppenheimer himself says, that's more than two of them. Interceptors would work. Well, they don't work. So now we don't know what country attacked us for.

00;09;07;13 - 00;09;34;08

Peter Huessy

Their deterrence and a retaliatory strike are not really possible because who do we hit now? Here's where it gets fun. They have a person playing a military officer and they're belittled.

They're made to look stupid. Why? Because the general says, well, I know we don't know where the missile came from, so let's hit everybody, which means China, Russia and North Korea, because the missiles coming across the Pacific, not over the pole but coming over the Pacific.

00;09;34;11 - 00;09;59;01

Peter Huessy

And no military officer that I know. And I've been dealing with these folks, these extraordinary dedicated servants since 1980, late 80, 80, early 81, in the nuclear business. And never once is anybody in the military anyway that I know of have said anything like, oh, let's go just nuke everybody. What the hell? Who cares? It's totally stupid.

00;09;59;01 - 00;10;26;09

Peter Huessy

And yet that is a big part of this movie to belittle the military. And then they say something else they go to throughout, throughout the three scenario three areas, they say the military thinks that if they just have the process right, deterrence works. Completely misunderstanding why we do tests and why we exercise. We demonstrate our deterrent so that the bad guys get the message.

00;10;26;16 - 00;10;52;14

Peter Huessy

Okay, apparently in the movie, the bad guys never got the message and decided to launch a rocket. Assuming that are satellite system wouldn't work and we wouldn't be able to know where it came from. And that's how we get in the first punch without being armed. It's utterly ridiculous. Ridiculous. And I think the military being belittled in the movie is the part that I really took exception to it.

00;10;52;14 - 00;11;20;18

Peter Huessy

In fact, in the military officers that I talked to and said, what did you think about the movie? It's interesting. Every single one of them came back with the same reaction they said, after the first five, ten minutes, they turned it off. They were so angry because of the way it belittled our military. But then I went back to them and said, well, you got to go watch it, because I want to know what your view and their views are very similar to what minor, which is.

00;11;20;20 - 00;11;45;03

Peter Huessy

This is not the real world. It doesn't help. It generates, I think, a feeling of helplessness. And it was designed to do that because that undermines the US deterrent and says, oh, this thing doesn't work. We need to get rid of it. There's a couple other points I want to make about this is they emphasize in the movie the short decision time that you have prior to the impact of an attacking warhead.

00;11;45;06 - 00;12;08;09

Peter Huessy

But in this case, the only decision the president can make is what shoot the missile down. And that's already taken care of by the fact that we miss. So, the only thing the president can do is one nothing. This whole thing is a decision to do what? You can't retaliate because you don't know who attacked you. You can't shoot it down because missile defense according to the

movie doesn't work.

00;12;08;12 - 00;12;31;26

Peter Huessy

So the script puts you in a position of basically helplessness. And it's all very nice to say, running around saying, oh my God, the war. It's going to hit Chicago in 15 minutes or 10 minutes or five minutes. That's not the real world. Someone may launch a rocket at us, but we'll know where it comes from. And the only question then is the president is when do you retaliate?

00;12;31;26 - 00;12;53;12

Peter Huessy

And in what way? So, the next point I get two more points, but I want to turn it over to Adam. The movie makes a big thing about being opposed to having the president have the sole authority to launch nuclear weapons. He is or she is obviously commander in chief. So they say somebody else must be in the loop.

00;12;53;14 - 00;13;18;20

Peter Huessy

Okay, who's it going to be? Speaker of the House, president pro tem, vice president, chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Secretary of defense. I don't know, but why would you take up more time to make a decision at the same time, you're emphasizing there's no time to make a decision because the time is so compressed. Doesn't make sense. And so they contradict themselves.

00;13;18;20 - 00;13;40;01

Peter Huessy

But it's a very subtle and a clever way of saying, well, we can't trust this president to use such weapons because he's reckless. And they say that as a movie, they don't say the current president, they just say a president may be reckless. And the thing is, we've had 80 years of nuclear deterrence. We're not one, says the president.

00;13;40;01 - 00;14;07;05

Peter Huessy

The United States authorized the launch of an ICBM or SLV, m or a bomber, and then we put bombers up for testing and demonstrations. But in that sense, they had to invent in this movie things that have never happened in the real world. In order to get us to question the very deterrent we've relied on for eight decades for deterrence, which has saved us.

00;14;07;07 - 00;14;24;04

Peter Huessy

I mean, can you imagine the cost of a nuclear war, let alone a conventional war? So with those remarks, Adam, I have some a very short summary here, which I'll do at the end, but I'd like to turn it over to you for your comments. If you would like to tell us some things.

00;14;24;06 - 00;15;04;06

Adam Lowther

All right. Well, thanks. Peter, of course. Assalamualaikum. And, ...from, Riyadh. So, if my wifi lags a little bit, you'll know it's because I'm 10,000 miles away. But, it's good to be here. Thanks for the invitation. So, I would just like to, to take a look back at Hollywood writ large in its sort of nuclear armageddon genre that you could, you know, you can really trace back to Fail-Safe

7

1964 and, of course, *Doctor Strangelove*.

00;15;04;08 - 00;15;29;02

Adam Lowther

And if you look at the genre writ large, take *Fail-Safe*, for example. So, *Fail-Safe* posits that the United States, through a series of mistakes, a series of failures, you know, accidentally starts nuclear war. And then, of course, we do it. And then we allow the Russians, you know, we have to allow our cities to New York to be destroyed.

00;15;29;05 - 00;15;58;10

Adam Lowther

And, you know, it's, you know, accidental nuclear war. Of course, this is a big problem. I mean, as you know, and as our audience know, it's happened quite frequently in the in the last 70 years, we have accidental nuclear wars all the time. But if you watch self *Fail-Safe*, it was imminent. Of course, it hasn't happened. If you look at, *Doctor Strangelove*, you know, there are secret systems that we don't know about that, are going to launch, Global Armageddon.

00;15;58;17 - 00;16;18;17

Adam Lowther

And if you didn't know, when you fly the bomber, you can actually ride the bomb to its target. I mean, that's something we can do. Then if you, you know, if you move forward, if you go to 1966, many people may not remember there was a movie called *War Game* that won an academy Award. It was a British movie.

00;16;18;19 - 00;16;42;21

Adam Lowther

And in that we had three minutes of warning time. And then we had a British apocalypse, based on an attack from a submarine. And of course, with that one, much of what was said was inaccurate. The weapons effects, the causes and what we expected to happen. It was inaccurate. Then let's show to 1983 when we have *War Games*, do you want to play a game?

00;16;42;23 - 00;17;15;16

Adam Lowther

And in that one, of course, we come very close to Armageddon because of a computer error. And of course, thanks. Thankfully, like most of these Hollywood movies, you know, it's the unexpected, hero that, prevents Armageddon, assuming it doesn't happen. But then let's go to the next movie, or let's take *Terminator* and the *Terminator* series, where, of course, you know, this is the worst of all worlds, where both A.I. and nuclear weapons are combined to destroy the human race.

00;17;15;19 - 00;17;38;09

Adam Lowther

And of course, we, you know, then we have time travel and we're constantly fighting AI enabled robots, and which is perhaps only slightly better than the world that we live in, in *Mad Max*. You know, it's it was, you know, a great series of movies as well, in which we live in this post-apocalyptic world, and we see how terrible it is.

00;17;38;16 - 00;18;01;22

Adam Lowther

And, of course, who do we blame? Well, we blame nuclear weapons for creating it. Now, many of you may not have seen a movie, that was called *Outside the Wire*, which was, of course, a post-apocalyptic movie in which we're using robots. AI enabled robots to go fight the bad guys. But it was another one that was, you know, pretty inaccurate.

00;18;01;22 - 00;18;30;29

Adam Lowther

And you know, exactly what would happen if a nuclear weapon were ever used. And then let's jump to Oppenheimer. So, take the Oppenheimer movie, and in the *Oppenheimer* movie, the thing that you take away as you close the movie out, you take two things away. First, you take Oppenheimer's regret away. He regretted ever building the bomb. And so you, the viewer, are supposed to feel what Oppenheimer felt.

00;18;30;29 - 00;18;54;09

Adam Lowther

And you're supposed to regret the creation of the nuclear bomb, just like he did. And if he regretted it, and he was the guy that built it, then you two should regret it. And that was what you should take away. And then secondly, of course, was that Lewis Strauss, you know, took away Oppenheimer's, you know, he was persecuted by Lewis Strauss.

00;18;54;09 - 00;19;35;04

Adam Lowther

Oppenheimer was because, you know, he was this guy that Oppenheimer that truly understood that this was a mistake. And so therefore, his security clearance was taken and he went through hell unjustly. Now, of course, we all know that a guy like Robert Oppenheimer, in today's world, most of you have some experience in the nuclear enterprise. He would have never gotten the clearance in the first place and would have never been brought on a project like that today, because his Communist past, his, peccadilloes and his associations would have never allowed him to, receive a clearance.

00;19;35;04 - 00;20;03;18

Adam Lowther

But that's not the message of the movie. The message of the movie is one that's just false. And then, of course, how many James Bond movies and how many Mission Impossible movies has a nuclear weapon been stolen? And if it weren't for Tom Cruise and James Bond, we would have had another nuclear Armageddon, because apparently the United States, Great Britain and other countries that have nuclear weapons, they just can't keep their hands on them.

00;20;03;20 - 00;20;32;06

Adam Lowther

So that in and of itself is another threat to global security that we have to worry about. Now, I don't know if you guys have seen the Emmy Award winning television show fallout, but that is another example of what, you know, and it's an attack on Los Angeles. And of course, that happens. The United States is destroyed, and then our lovable characters have to live in a post-apocalyptic world.

00;20;32;08 - 00;21;02;27

Adam Lowther

But then finally we get to dynamite. And like any good Hollywood movie about nuclear weapons,

9

there's an unexpected hero a young guy. He's the deputy national security advisor. And apparently, everything that I know about how the United States and how we make nuclear decisions is isn't true. It's guys running around on cell phones who make decisions. It's not a well thought out, coordinated process that happens on secure comms.

00;21;03;00 - 00;21;41;09

Adam Lowther

And, it's is well planned. And, and, I mean, most of you know how it works, so I won't go into too much detail, but you know that, dynamite adds, a bit too much. Intrigue and uncertainty. And then, as Peter has sort of laid out in some of the other in his comments, just like in Annie Jacobsen's book, what she says in terms of the United States, sending nuclear weapons to hit North Korea and they overfly Russia and we start, you know, another apocalypse.

00;21;41;09 - 00;22;11;15

Adam Lowther

And none of that is how we actually operate. And so if you look at this, Hollywood is I've kind of laid it out. Hollywood is created, a set of movies over, you know, six decades. And those movies always incorrectly predict how we operate within the nuclear enterprise and within the Department of Defense. What weapons effects look like, what we could expect.

00;22;11;17 - 00;22;59;14

Adam Lowther

Who is in charge in their competency? You know, if you really think about it in all of these movies, the American leadership is is universally inept. And, of course, you know, because they're universally inept. That's why all these terrible things happen. And we always get a part in apocalypse, and they're never actually accurate in predicting or or, illustrating the competency of the military, the competency of the political leadership, what weapons effects actually look like, how we employ weapons, what that process is now, it's it may be secret in the fine details, but it is available for us to, you know, to put into those movies in a more accurate way.

00;22;59;17 - 00;23;30;25

Adam Lowther

And then I guess I would finally conclude my comments by saying, I think we as a nuclear community need to do a bit more. I mean, while we may dismiss these movies as sort of entertainment and Hollywood, they do leave an impression. And just like any Jacobson's book, I mean, I got to be honest, as a guy who writes books about nuclear weapons, I'm jealous of how many podcasts she's been on and how well her book is done.

00;23;31;00 - 00;23;55;11

Adam Lowther

None of my books on nuclear weapons have done anywhere near as well as hers, have. And and it's because I don't create a compelling story like she does. And so one of the things that I would submit to our community as a whole is that we have to be very careful, and we have to be more willing to help make sure that, we get the record straight first.

00;23;55;14 - 00;24;08;00

Adam Lowther

So perhaps we need to help Hollywood get the details accurate, assuming they're they're interested and willing. And then when they get them wrong, we have to be willing to help correct

10

the record, and I'll stop there. Thanks, Peter.

00;24;08;02 - 00;24;33;11

Peter Huessy

Well, thank you, Adam, I have a couple points I'd like to make that I collected from, the movie *Dynamite*. But more than that, there are a whole lot of companion essays and, modules that say this is how you're meant to look at the movie. This is how you're meant to react. Because one of the reactions that a lot of people had was, boy, we really do need missile defense.

00;24;33;14 - 00;24;57;04

Peter Huessy

And there is a specific module put out by one of the arms control groups, plus an essay by one of their people saying, you're not meant to come away thinking missile defense is good. In fact, don't do that because that's not the message of the movie. A couple things I want to point out is they make a big thing of President Reagan watching the movie you talked about at Camp David.

00;24;57;06 - 00;25;28;14

Peter Huessy

And I know from talking to one of the Secret Service people that was with him that his comment after was, we have to fix this. And what he was talking about was the..., the communications process. He wasn't talking about fixing as in reducing nuclear weapons, because a year before, over a year before seeing the movie, he denounced at the National Press Club the iron F00 option and a 50% cut under START 1 of all our strategic nuclear weapons.

00;25;28;17 - 00;25;52;24

Peter Huessy

He had said this actually, if you go way all the way back to 1976. In remarks to the Committee on the Present Danger, he had opposed the salt process because he said it's a buildup, not a build down. And if you remember the first question he got and his first press conference as president in 1981, he was asked by, I believe, was the Associated Press.

00;25;52;27 - 00;26;16;02

Peter Huessy

Are you going to continue to observe SALT 2, which had never been ratified by the Senate? The Senate kicked it back to the president, and at that time was President Carter. So we never agreed to it. So too. But it was fascinating to me. Is the guy from the AP, Mr. Burns seems not to have listened to President Reagan during the campaign when he said it was to the SALT process.

00;26;16;05 - 00;26;46;29

Peter Huessy

I want to have reductions, not an agreement, which what Salt was was an agreement to go up. The second thing, as I mentioned already, is don't do missile defense, which is contrary to when you look at the movie and you say, well, I really need to shoot this stuff down. And what goes on is Oppenheimer, who's the script writer over and over and over again, says that all missile defenses would have to be impenetrable to be valuable, and that that was our goal, when in fact, that's not the idea.

00;26;47;02 - 00;27;10;25

Peter Huessy

Israel does not have an impenetrable missile defense. They just been able to shoot down over 95% of everything, which dramatically changed the leverage they had in their war with Gaza and Hezbollah and Iran. And the idea of Golden Dome, for example, is to make it that much more difficult for an enemy to attack us, particularly preemptively and to try to disarm us, which is what our big fear was.

00;27;10;27 - 00;27;52;14

Peter Huessy

The fourth thing that kind of drives me nuts is that these, these Hollywood people still think we are part of a policy called mutual assured destruction. Meaning you launch a war at us, we'll throw everything back at you and we'll all die. And that doesn't make sense, when in fact, that hasn't been our policy. I would say, from at least the early 1950s, when in fact, we had massive retaliation, which is what Eisenhower wanted to do if the Russian tanks came across the folded gap into Western Europe, we would massively attack their military capability and not necessarily blow Moscow and Saint Petersburg off the map of the year.

00;27;52;16 - 00;28;25;00

Peter Huessy

Now, the last two points, I think is really, really important. In 1979, there was a false warning. Someone put a training tape in one of the computers in Omaha and there was a warning that there was a Russian attack, Soviet attack coming with missiles. I know, one of the pilots at one of our Air Force bases actually got into his B-52 and was ready to taxi when he got a call and saying, don't worry, false alarm, don't worry about it.

00;28;25;03 - 00;29;04;19

Peter Huessy

What's interesting is that was used as the basis to assume that we're going to have this problem continuously, where we have a false warning of an attack. We then launch our weapons and then we find out, oops, that was a mistake. What happened is that the industry went in, was asked by the Stratcom, Will you fix this thing so that whenever we do a training tape, it doesn't go on the regular system, which they did, and the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gary Hart from Colorado and Barry Goldwater from Arizona jointly wrote a report for the committee saying, we have fix this.

00;29;04;22 - 00;29;31;02

Peter Huessy

And yet that was 1979 and 80 was when the report came out. But we had a number of people just a couple of years ago, and for the last decade or so saying that this was a real problem and that we had to get rid of our ICBMs because, my God, we might president might be falsely informed about an attack and launch them, when in fact that's been fixed.

00;29;31;05 - 00;30;00;04

Peter Huessy

The other point I want to make is in 1999, Boris Yeltsin signed in April of that year a memo. And the memo said, build me low yield, highly accurate battlefield nuclear weapons, which I can use. And the person who probably wrote that was Mr. Putin, because I believe he was secretary of the National Security Council at their version of the Security Council.

00;30;00;07 - 00;30;31;14

Peter Huessy

And that is what Mr. Yeltsin, Mr. Putin, has done because his people are friends, like Mark Schneider and others have pointed out, the Russians have at least 1900, 2000 theater nuclear weapons. And Mark thinks they probably have around 4000. And Jim Howe down in Alabama also thinks that they have that number. And what's interesting is a new book has come out from Harvard by Chinese gentleman who says we made a mistake.

00;30;31;14 - 00;31;21;25

Peter Huessy

The Chinese warheads are a lot smaller than we thought they were, and this is a very long book. But what's interesting is that means the Chinese can put a lot more warheads on their existing missiles than we thought they could. And when my friend, Jim Howe and Rick Fisher, two top notch experts in this business, they gave me some numbers yesterday and it was if you look at the estimates we made in 2022 of what China would be like in 2030, 20 and 35, but they determined that we were 800% low compared to what we're saying today about missiles and 1,000% tenfold lower than what the warheads will be in the year 2030, 2035.

00;31;21;27 - 00;31;42;24

Peter Huessy

That, as Admiral Richard said every time he got a briefing on China, the Chinese were doubling the number of warheads he thought they were going to have and they were doing it. And half the time now he was our former district commander. He's retired. He's now going to be head of the, I can't remember.

00;31;42;24 - 00;31;45;02

Adam Lowther

It's the Institute for Defense Analysis.

00;31;45;05 - 00;32;18;28

Peter Huessy

by Larry Welch was. And so he's going to be in March, I believe. And, I think that's a great a great thing that he will be there. So the mythologies that are re-emphasized by these movies and books do a real disservice, because not that they're it's not just that they're wrong, which they are. They push us toward a rigged narrative where nuclear deterrence is bad.

00;32;19;00 - 00;32;47;06

Peter Huessy

America is incompetent. We shouldn't spend money on this stuff. We should, you know, de-emphasize it. And we miss the fact that the bad guys out there are the problem. Not STRATCOM not Global Strike, not A-10 in the Air Force or not SSP, these are courageous, wonderfully competent people who have kept us safe for eight decades, and they continue to do so.

00;32;47;08 - 00;33;20;07

Peter Huessy

And now we have two here nuclear armed countries, China and Russia, who've never faced before, which was going to require an enormous amount of work and dedication. And the good news is, Congress has supported a very robust nuclear deterrent budget, which the president

13

proposed and. The further good news is we've supported and Congress has voted on it. And hopefully the appropriation bill passed before the end of January, which is what the current schedule is.

00;33;20;09 - 00;33;33;06

Peter Huessy

The bad news is we keep having Hollywood and our friends in various groups in this country trying to undermine the very deterrent that keeps us safe. So, Adam, I'll turn it back to you, sir.

00;33;33;08 - 00;34;02;02

Adam Lowther

I guess I would just make a couple of points and that would be, you know, for Hollywood, if they were to actually get the processes, the effects, the process right. The movie wouldn't be particularly interesting, because you wouldn't have, you wouldn't have a hero winging it and through sheer determination and just good luck, you know, the world is saved.

00;34;02;04 - 00;34;29;10

Adam Lowther

You know, that's basically the storyline of every *Mission Impossible* movie. And that wouldn't be possible. And so therefore, you know, that they'd never do that. And what I would like to see, you know, since we're talking about Hollywood in its coverage of nuclear weapons, what I would like to see is a movie. And in that movie, we've denuclearize to and there's no more nuclear weapons.

00;34;29;12 - 00;34;53;11

Adam Lowther

But now there's World War three, and it's a conventional war. And based on the fact that the, you know, the world's population has grown by 400% since 1945. We need to see a war in which half a billion people are killed, because that would be, you know, that would be the percentages if we had a World War three.

00;34;53;11 - 00;35;18;27

Adam Lowther

So, we need half a billion dead through conventional war. And then we need, you know, the the ending of the movie to say something like, have we just not eliminated nuclear weapons? We could have avoided this. And then we can have a what I think would be a far more accurate movie with a actually an interesting plot line.

00;35;19;02 - 00;35;46;22

Adam Lowther

And you can have heroes throughout the movie, who save, you know, countless lives, but you're going to still end up at the point where you have hundreds of millions dead in a conventional conflict. And we've gotten a lot better at killing conventionally than we were in 1945. So the ability to do that is actually pretty accurate. We have lots of Russians and angry Russians, and we've got the Chinese who are expansionist, and we've got the United States and Europe.

00;35;46;29 - 00;36;00;25

Adam Lowther

So, we've got all of the main combatants that you need for such a movie. Now, that's the movie I would like to see, but I don't think it's the movie Hollywood would ever actually produce and send to a theater.

00;36;00;27 - 00;36;28;26

Peter Huessy

You know? Well, Adam, it's interesting, the Admiral me some time ago, back in, I think it was 2012, wrote an extraordinarily good piece for the Under Siege Undersea Warfare magazine about nuclear deterrence. And he had a chart in there that the chief of Naval Operations had put, and it showed the number of people dying in war per tap, per 100,000 people that rate.

00;36;28;28 - 00;36;54;16

Peter Huessy

And it showed throughout hit through the last 4 or 500 years of history. And then it falls off a table at 40, 1945. It's really quite interesting how what very small percent of the number of people that die every year in warfare, even though, as you said, we're getting very good at this stuff in terms of terrorism and wars and national liberation and the things that we saw all during the Cold War.

00;36;54;16 - 00;37;30;24

Peter Huessy

But the numbers really did fall off the table. And part of it is nuclear weapons have kept the world from an all out conventional war, albeit there are a lot of conflicts going on in the world that are horrible, and they killed a lot of people. But it is quite remarkable the numbers that, Admiral Meese put in that paper and, it's it it does show you that nuclear deterrence has had an extraordinary impact on dramatically curtailing the number of people that, I think, in World War one and World War, 200 million people were killed.

00;37;30;26 - 00;37;36;24

Peter Huessy

And, that was basically in, what, eight years of war?

00;37;36;26 - 00;38;06;18

Adam Lowther

Yeah. I mean, it's, you know, the graph here you're talking about was, you know, the Stratcom staff built that chart, right? About 20, 30 years ago. And, you know, the charts actually stood the test. Did there have been those who have challenged the accuracy of the chart? But the numbers are actually quite accurate. And, you know, it's it's basically a 90 plus percent reduction in combat related casualties post 1945.

00;38;06;22 - 00;38;30;11

Adam Lowther

And I would submit to you that, you know, part of the reason I mentioned population growth, I would submit to you that if you, you know, you follow how populations grow, that the lack of conflict and the lack of large scale death has enabled the world's population to, you know, burgeoned as it has. And so whether that's a good thing or a bad thing, I'll leave it up to folks to decide.

00;38;30;11 - 00;38;43;25

Adam Lowther

But the stability and the lack of warfare, large scale warfare that nuclear weapons have prevented is, is in some respects responsible, you know, for the population boom. We've seen.

00;38;43;28 - 00;39;18;05

Peter Huessy

So I think the prosperity that you see in the world and the extraordinary reduction in poverty, we've been able to kind of work around the terrible wars that we like the Korean War in Vietnam. But my concern has always been the wars of like in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola, El Salvador, Colombia, because having spent time in El Salvador and looking at the extent to which the... and the Cubans and the Russians killed people in that, country, killing their own people, which is what the ... did.

00;39;18;05 - 00;39;47;16

Peter Huessy

I think the, the black book of communism points out that communist societies from 1917 to the end of the Cold War or the collapse of the Soviet Union, killed 95, know, killed 120 million of their own people. I'm not to my soldiers, I'm told by their own people, in order to sustain and maintain and keep power. And so part of deterrence is obviously think more of their own survival than those of their own people.

00;39;47;16 - 00;40;11;18

Peter Huessy

So that's why our deterrence policy is we go after the leadership, we go after the security forces to keep them in power. We go after the military capability, the weapons, and we go over the military industry that builds the weapons. We don't go over, we don't decide to burn down cities, which is if there's one message I wish Hollywood would get is drop the word mad from your vocabulary because we don't have a bad policy.

00;40;11;18 - 00;40;32;00

Peter Huessy

It's not our strategy. We're not bloodthirsty when it comes to that burning the city of Moscow, our state leaders ground is not going to stop Russia from hurling rockets at us, which I think is very, very important. What I'd like to do, Adam, now is turn it over to my our president, Jim Petrosky, and see if he has any questions.

00;40;32;00 - 00;40;43;16

Peter Huessy

And, Kimberly, if you could look in the chat function and see if you see any questions, we would be delighted to hear from our audience.

00;40;43;19 - 00;41;06;10

Jim Petrosky

Thanks, Peter. It looks like my mine is delayed. Look, this is really good. I first of all, I appreciate what you and Adam have done here in, And in sort of framing this argument about the effect of Hollywood on our main business of national security and nuclear weapons. They have a great impact. So, I sort of put a tongue in cheek, comment in there for Adam.

00;41;06;10 - 00;41;28;25

Jim Petrosky

He can he can respond to that regarding the, Budapest Memorandum. But one of my comments that people will ask me as a scientist about *Oppenheimer* and they'll they'll say, well, have you seen the movie? What do you think of it? My problem is that a lot of times when it when Hollywood puts out information about any scientific project, it always it's, you know, it's magic.

00;41;28;25 - 00;41;55;28

Jim Petrosky

It's like everything's magic and it's not magic is hard work. There's there's airman out there, daily sitting there, the heroes, you know, sitting in those, missile silos and, you know, working, working the Intel, etc. every day. Can you speak to that of how that sort of, in my opinion, devalues what our great airmen, what our great or our great, leaders do to make sure that we are secure?

00;41;55;28 - 00;42;02;12

Jim Petrosky

Because I think most people miss that. And how we might be able to capture that.

00;42;02;15 - 00;42;05;01

Peter Huessy

Go ahead. And Adam.

00;42;05;04 - 00;42;28;25

Adam Lowther

Well, I mean, that's that's a that's sort of the the challenge of making a good Hollywood movie because for I mean, look at the, you know, the folks that are, you know, here today who have, you know, pulled an alert, pulling an alert is a terrible movie. And so therefore, because it's, you know, it's it's not, exciting.

00;42;28;25 - 00;42;56;05

Adam Lowther

It's not, it's not, something that you would want to sit and watch for two hours. And so, you know, and it goes against, you know, an ideology that I would say, you know, borders on sort of, false religion. And that is that nuclear weapons are inherently bad. And, and they're, they're given, you know, human characteristics.

00;42;56;08 - 00;43;25;00

Adam Lowther

And so therefore, you could never show in a positive light. You could never, produce a movie and, you know, send a movie to the American public that that might swing the pendulum the opposite way. There's a reason that, the bulletin of the assault, of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* clock always gets closer to midnight. I've always found it amazing that it really never moves the opposite way.

00;43;25;03 - 00;43;51;13

Adam Lowther

We're always getting closer to midnight. And that's because there's a narrative. And in that narrative is that these things are bad. And the longer we go with them that we're inherently going to have, you know, no matter what the technological developments, no matter how much

17

better we get at safety, how much better we get it detecting, launches, how much better we get at anything.

00;43;51;15 - 00;44;12;10

Adam Lowther

We're still closer because of the very existence of time to something bad happening. So to demonstrate the work of airmen and, success of scientist, any of that would be to challenge, the narrative that that I don't think is something that's feasible.

00;44;12;12 - 00;44;51;24

Peter Huessy

You know, I'd like to there's a question in the chat which is quite interesting, is that the DSV Early Warning satellite, according to the movie, misses the launch, but they don't know why. And they think, oh, maybe it was spoofed, maybe it was hatched. And, the general who's head of Stratcom, speculates that maybe this single launches is part of a more comprehensive attack, which I understand, but then what the issue was that just we don't know why the DSB early warning satellite didn't tell us where something came from.

00;44;51;27 - 00;45;24;14

Peter Huessy

And it is true it wasn't those satellites, but the..., an NSBX radar, which we used in Alaska and Greenland. They're the one that tracked the missile coming across the Pacific as opposed to the DSB. But I still think the movie rigged the system by just we're not told why, but we missed the launch. And my question is, in all the decades we've had DSV, we have never we have not missed a launch.

00;45;24;16 - 00;45;59;24

Peter Huessy

Okay. We either someone announces it as a test or like the Norwegian sounding rocket or. We know where it's coming from. And we take we understand why it's being shot off. Because I think it's quite fascinating that they had to invent the idea that the DSP, how do we make sure they are not working? Well, then they say, well, an IP spoof might be hacked, which is I understand, but again, makes us look incompetent.

00;45;59;26 - 00;46;32;01

Adam Lowther

Can I, answer Rich, asks a good question based on the movie *House of Dynamite*. Should the president participate in exercise scenarios involving the use of U.S. nuclear weapons to develop a basic understanding of options? And so this is a great question. And I mean, you can speak to this, Peter, because you were there, but if I understand, correct, if I remember correctly, the last president to actually participate was Regan.

00;46;32;04 - 00;46;59;19

Adam Lowther

And then when he after participating, he was told, don't do that again, because anything you may do may signal the Russians how you might respond in a given scenario. And this is, of course, unlike what, President Putin, for example, does in his participation in the pot. And so it's the US president who is largely ignorant of. And this is it doesn't matter which political party it's both.

00;46;59;22 - 00;47;48;05

Adam Lowther

The president is largely ignorant of sort of how nuclear weapons operate and what his options might be and why he might choose one. And, and, and it's one of those topics where a president you know, who is inherently a political figure knows you know the least. And so to Rich's question, at least in my mind, it would be a very good idea, I think, for the president to have much greater familiarity with, you know, what, options are, why he might choose one versus the other to spend even in a, you know, even though the president has many competing interests, I'm not sure any decision he could make is more consequential than whether

00;47;48;05 - 00;48;11;09

Adam Lowther

and how to use nuclear weapons. So it would have I would submit to you into the group that it would, of course, be a good idea for the president to return to participation, even in some capacity. That's let's say it's not public, which was the concern for, you know, in the Reagan era, and that that would in fact be a good idea.

00;48;11;11 - 00;48;47;10

Adam Lowther

And then to speak to, you know, Stevens Point, about, you know, questioning the validity of, you know, the chart that says nuclear weapons have produced peace, to your your one point where you agree with me that we have, you know, four times as many people and I don't buy the argument that because we have a much larger population, therefore a smaller percentage die in war because with a much larger population means you have a much higher population density, which means it's much easier to kill a lot of people.

00;48;47;13 - 00;49;00;27

Adam Lowther

And so therefore, I don't buy the the idea that you know, more people means lower death rates. It just means it's easier to kill in big numbers. And and then to.

00;49;00;29 - 00;49;29;14

Peter Huessy

Interject here because and so Steve's, comment, if you look at the Admiral Weeks chart, which people have updated in the period between 1914 and 1945, 30 years, 3 million people a year died from war. That number is much, much lower today in gross numbers in terms of the annual number of people dying from war. And this includes civilian as well as military.

00;49;29;16 - 00;49;53;14

Peter Huessy

Now, I'm not including the people that the communists killed on their own, of their own people, internal and civil wars or, just the Gulag in China and Russia. But when you look at the numbers, the gross number has declined dramatically. Now, when you have a much bigger population than the percent of the population, also goes down dramatically.

00;49;53;16 - 00;50;15;27

Peter Huessy

But when you look at the gross numbers, they are significantly less. We way down by about

19

90% below where they were, at the between where during World War I and World War II. So I would make that point because, it's more than just, oh, we have much bigger population, same number of deaths as a lower percentage.

00;50;16;00 - 00;50;18;12

Peter Huessy

So sorry. Sorry to interrupt. And.

00;50;18;14 - 00;50;44;23

Adam Lowther

Yeah. And then to the point, you know, on numbers, you know, in let's take our last two large scale conventional conflicts. And I would argue with the, the death numbers that you provide, Steve. And I would say it's about 100 million, but, it's not just the wars in the conflict related casualties. It's what happens after.

00;50;44;26 - 00;51;07;27

Adam Lowther

So, World War I ultimately led to the creation of the Soviet Union, which killed, you know, 10 million Ukrainians. And, you know, at least 30 million Russians. And then World War Two, ultimately, you know, was what enabled the Chinese Communist Party to win a civil war. And then that led to at least 60 million deaths of Chinese.

00;51;08;04 - 00;51;29;03

Adam Lowther

So, their second and third order effects and the second and third order effects of nuclear, of, great power Wars of world wars have never been positive ones. And if you look at, like the economic loss from these large scale conventional wars, now, is that to say that, if a nuclear war were to happen, that it would be cost free?

00;51;29;03 - 00;51;50;15

Adam Lowther

Of course not. But the fact that it would be very costly is why they don't happen. And I think this goes to, you know, Prospect Theory. And I'm sure, you know, many in the audience are familiar with Prospect Theory. And, you know, the basic argument is that and I would argue that it really explains why nuclear deterrence works well.

00;51;50;18 - 00;52;20;21

Adam Lowther

And that is that because humans are naturally risk adverse. And so when they when they have a potential loss, they tend to be irrationally risk averse. Now, when they're guaranteed a loss, they become risk accepting, which I would submit to you, explains, when you tell a guy like Saddam Hussein, you must leave. He says, well, if I'm guaranteed to lose my control of Iraq, I might as well fight the Americans.

00;52;20;23 - 00;52;47;26

Adam Lowther

And that's why, you know, conventional deterrence fails. But nuclear deterrence holds because people say, man, a nuclear war would be terrible. So therefore, let's not fight at all. And so I would submit to you that that's probably a good reason why things work. And we, you know,

20

wanted to make sure we address Stephen's question because we don't want to, you know, ignore the challenging questions.

00;52;47;26 - 00;52;58;08

Adam Lowther

And that's a great question, Steve. Thanks for that. It's, it's one that's worth addressing. How about did you want to address? Kathleen's question, Peter?

00;52;58;11 - 00;53;28;16

Peter Huessy

Well, there's the question about Hollywood and Congress, because I deal with Congress a lot. And the the narrative that you see in these movies, in these books. I was talking to a member of the House, senior member of the House a number of months ago, and he said, the way we deflect Hollywood is we just show them the numbers from Russia and China, and we go, Holy cow, that's that's bad.

00;53;28;19 - 00;53;56;00

Peter Huessy

They're building up. So the, the, the natural inclination most members of the House and Senate is we need to maybe not match them warhead from warhead. But as the commission on the this issue in 2023 pointed out, what we have is necessary but not adequate. We need to do that. So that's, it's a very good question about how to counter the Hollywood narrative.

00;53;56;00 - 00;54;29;03

Peter Huessy

The other question was ... it is, isn't it valuable to raise the issue of nuclear deterrence in the public consciousness? And I say it's valuable if you do it right, because if you do it wrong, you then have to undo the narrative that the false narrative that has become embedded. I'll give you one example. I'm, I grew up some of my life in Vermont, and I remember talking to Senator Pat Leahy, who was a friend, and I said, I really need your support for missile defense.

00;54;29;05 - 00;54;58;03

Peter Huessy

And this was after the end of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and it was GPOs and ALPS. One by Yeltsin, one by Bush, were being proposed. And he come back to me and he says, oh, you mean Star Wars? That was the narrative in his head. Of course he was opposed to it. And thank God you only have about 12 co-sponsors of a bill from Senator.

00;54;58;06 - 00;55;22;09

Peter Huessy

Markey of Massachusetts and Bernie Sanders of Vermont to cut down to 150 ICBMs for submarines. No bombers and do that unilaterally. That's their build in the hopper now. So I think thank God we I don't know how many, but I think they have 12 co-sponsors. Last time I looked in terms of either that or the people they thought might vote for it.

00;55;22;09 - 00;55;50;13

Peter Huessy

So, yeah, it's valuable to do. That's why we at NIDS, we spend our entire work raising consciousness about nuclear deterrence. The issue is that when you build a a narrative that's

21

false, you have to undo it in order to get back to square one, where you then can lay out something more positive. Go ahead. Adam, I didn't mean to take all that time, but I know that's really important.

00;55;50;16 - 00;56;36;08

Adam Lowther

Yeah, I wouldn't, but to answer Kathleen's specific question about the influence of of China, you know, if if you remember 20, 30, 30 years ago, 20 years ago, there was, you know, Saudi Arabia spent quite a bit of money and DC in the think tanks and universities to promote a positive view of Saudi Arabia. And more recently, the Chinese have focused, if you go back to like seven years in Tibet, for example, you would notice that all of the films critical of of China's, you know, invasion and acquisition of Tibet, they've ceased.

00;56;36;08 - 00;57;08;29

Adam Lowther

You would never find that again. And so, of course, you know, Kathleen's right in the sense that China has spent broadly in Hollywood to fund films that either a make China look good or b, make sure China isn't made to look badly. And then if you actually watch Chinese films and I would encourage people to go watch Chinese films, you know, that are in in Mandarin, those films generally have an American bad guy.

00;57;09;02 - 00;57;35;02

Adam Lowther

And so, there is a very clear effort to shape our view of China and to make it, you know, one that is, less negative. And, you know, of course, in their own film, we are the bad guy. And so it's, it's a very, you know, and this is pretty consistent for the Chinese, where one thing is said in English and a second thing is said in Mandarin, because most of us don't speak it.

00;57;35;05 - 00;58;05;21

Adam Lowther

So, you know, that's something that I think is, you know, I think Kathleen's pretty, right. And the other thing to answer, you know, Ian and, and Karen's question about these movies and their utility, I would submit to you that that they they do give us an opportunity to both clarify facts and to help improve, you know, the broader public's understanding of nuclear weapons.

00;58;05;25 - 00;58;28;14

Adam Lowther

But that's only if we do it. And for, you know, the vast majority of the folks that are here today, you know, that, have spent their careers in or around the nuclear enterprise, you know, you have to say something and you have to write. You know, I, I saw Don Cook was here. I want to see more articles from Don Cook.

00;58;28;16 - 00;58;52;20

Adam Lowther

I want to see more articles from the other folks in the audience who are when they see these articles, and they or these movies or these books, you know, like Annie Jacobson's, who know that there are factual errors. I want to see them writing and publishing and speaking and going on podcasts. Annie Jacobson's been on the podcast circuit for at least six months now.

00;58;52;22 - 00;59;17;08

Adam Lowther

Who is the guy or gal that's followed her on the Joe Rogan Show to say, hey, here's everything that's wrong with what Annie Jacobson said and why none of this is how things would happen. And so that's what I would, you know, where I think there could be value is that, you know, if iron sharpens iron, if that be true, then we need to be out there, you know, iron sharpening iron.

00;59;17;08 - 00;59;42;23

Adam Lowther

Because for advocates of nuclear abolition, they're certainly out there making their case. I don't think we're as actively making our own case because we rely on, you know, the reality of the world we live in to make the case for us. And that can work to some degree. But we still have an obligation to inform the American public.

00;59;42;25 - 01;00;08;09

Peter Huessy

I would second what Adam said, and I want to turn it back over to you, Jim or Kimberly, for any final remarks and what we're going to have next week. And I want to thank our audience, for their participation. And I want to thank Steve Schwartz. Always answer good question. I'd like to thank you for the clarification on the individual sent me about the, radars.

01;00;08;11 - 01;00;19;13

Peter Huessy

That was important. And I'll incorporate that in my analysis of, what I call the abolition trilogy.

01;00;19;15 - 01;00;43;23

Kimberly Cherington

Very good. Well, we want to thank everyone for being here today. This conversation is just beginning. Feel free to send any specific questions to me. I'll pass them on to Adam and to Peter. But thank you so much, Dr. Lower and Mr. Huessy for sharing your expertise and shedding light on how movies can often, misrepresent critical aspects of our national security.

01;00;43;25 - 01;01;10;19

Kimberly Cherington

Your insights not only, clarify misconceptions, but also deepen our understanding. And what a perfect time during the holidays when we're sitting at our table with guests and family to talk about these movies and, sort of, hash out some of the details. If you're new to NIDS, we're a 501 C3 nonprofit dedicated to advancing peace and promoting stability.

01;01;10;22 - 01;01;46;14

Kimberly Cherington

As, Peter and Adam have, told you through we do it through a strong national security and nuclear deterrent. We offer a wide range of deterrence education, from live and virtual events like this one to podcasts, publications, workshops, and courses. Through our NIDS Academy, we have a full lineup of events and speakers. Next week on Friday, we have one at 10:00, and we hope you will join us for the next proposed, NPR for 2026.

01;01;46;16 - 01;02;11;18

Kimberly Cherington

Please make sure your you and your colleagues are on our invitation list by emailing us at NIDS@thinkdeterrence.com or directly to me at KCherington@ThinkDeterrence.com and we'll get you on that guest list. Thank you for being part of our growing community, and be sure to follow us on LinkedIn. Share our content with your networks and help us spread the word.

01;02;11;20 - 01;02;13;17

Kimberly Cherington

We hope you have a peaceful day.