

National Institute for Deterrence Studies & Peter Huessy Seminar

**Rebuilding Lethality: Conservative Priorities for U.S. Nuclear and Missile
Defense in FY 2027 with Robert Peters**

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Abstract

The Huessy Seminar, hosted by the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, examined conservative priorities for U.S. nuclear and missile defense in the FY 2027 budget. Robert Peters of the Heritage Foundation highlighted the strategic imperative to realign defense spending toward Indo-Pacific deterrence, expand munitions stockpiles, accelerate production of B-21 bombers and Virginia-class submarines, and modernize the nuclear triad. Key recommendations included revitalizing shipbuilding through a new Naval Act, increasing forward-deployed capabilities, and developing a diverse arsenal of approximately 4,625 operationally deployed weapons by mid-century. Peters stressed that without urgent cultural and structural reforms in acquisition and industrial capacity, the U.S. risks losing its competitive edge against near-peer adversaries

Executive Summary

The session outlined conservative priorities for the FY 2027 U.S. defense budget, focusing on nuclear deterrence and missile defense modernization. Robert Peters presented Heritage Foundation's recommendations to strengthen U.S. capabilities amid growing threats from China, Russia, and global instability.

Key Themes and Insights

1. **Current Wins and Challenges**
 - FY 2026 saw significant gains through a major supplemental defense bill, including investments in munitions, nuclear modernization, and the Golden Dome missile defense initiative.
 - However, structural realignment within the defense budget remains insufficient. Peters emphasized that future progress requires prioritization—not just increased funding.
2. **Strategic Priorities for FY 2027**
 - **Western Hemisphere:** Reinforce border security and counter-narcotics operations via Joint Interagency Task Force South and expanded Coast Guard capacity.
 - **Indo-Pacific Focus:** Treat China as the pacing threat; prioritize Navy and Air Force modernization over Army growth.
 - **Industrial Base Expansion:** Increase shipbuilding capacity, incentivize workforce development, and accelerate submarine production (minimum three Virginia-class subs annually).
3. **Modernization Imperatives**
 - **Munitions:** Expand procurement of precision-guided munitions, Patriot missiles, THAAD interceptors, SM-3/SM-6, and long-range strike weapons.
 - **Air and Naval Power:** Accelerate B-21 bomber production (target 250–300 aircraft), KC-46 tankers, and maritime prepositioning squadrons.
 - **Shipbuilding:** Launch a new Naval Act for block buys, reestablish First Fleet, and build a fifth public shipyard.
4. **Nuclear Enterprise Recommendations**
 - Upload additional warheads to ICBMs and sustain modernization of Sentinel, Columbia-class SSBNs, and SLCM-N.
 - Develop a diverse arsenal of ~4,625 operationally deployed weapons by 2050, including hypersonic and ground-launched systems for Indo-Pacific and European theaters.
 - Consider resuming nuclear testing to validate reliability of future warheads.
5. **Cultural and Bureaucratic Challenges**
 - Peters warned of insufficient urgency within the Pentagon and NNSA, calling for streamlined acquisition processes, regulatory waivers, and a shift from risk-averse culture to strategic urgency.

Actionable Recommendations

- **Congress:** Support industrial base incentives, workforce training programs, and long-term procurement strategies.
- **DoD & NNSA:** Accelerate modernization timelines, expand forward deployment in Indo-Pacific, and adopt a more directive approach to missile defense architecture.
- **Industry:** Respond to demand signals by investing in capacity for munitions and shipbuilding.

Closing Note

The seminar underscored that without decisive prioritization and urgency, the U.S. risks falling behind adversaries in nuclear and missile defense capabilities. Heritage’s roadmap calls for bold investments, structural reforms, and a multi-decade commitment to deterrence.

Unabridged Transcript

(Note: The following transcript was automatically generated and will invariably have some occasional word errors or inaccuracies.)

00;00;04;28 - 00;00;31;00

Kimberly Cherington

Good morning. I'm Kimberly Cherington, and on behalf of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, or NIDS, it's my pleasure to welcome you to today's Huessy Seminar. Today's, our special guest is Mr. Bob Peters, and he'll present the Heritage Foundation's latest defense report outlining conservative priorities for the US nuclear and missile defense for the fiscal year 2027 budget.

00;00;31;03 - 00;01;03;28

Kimberly Cherington

Please join us here for a full month of programming in December beginning December 5th. We have Peter Huessy and Dr. Adam Lowther. They'll present Hollywood versus Reality Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Dynamite, and Oppenheimer. On December 12th. Don't miss Dr. Petrosky, Curtis McGiffin, Kirk Fansher for an in-depth discussion on the NIDS latest research insights with a proposed Nuclear Posture Review for 2026.

00;01;04;03 - 00;01;35;24

Kimberly Cherington

You can find that on our website now. On December 19th, Join us for strategic perspective on nuclear modernization with Dave Hoagland. If you'd like to explore any of these, activities and events, including publications, reports and podcasts, please visit us on at Thinkdeterrence.com. We're constantly adding new speakers and content, so be sure to check in often and follow us on social media to stay informed.

00;01;35;26 - 00;02;13;05

Kimberly Cherington

And if you and your colleagues would like to get on the invite list for future events directly, just email us at NIDS@Thinkdeterrence.com. Throughout today's presentation, we encourage you to submit your questions using the chat or the Q&A button at the top of your screen. We'll address them during the dedicated Q&A portion of the seminar. Now, I'm delighted to introduce our host for today's discussion, the honored Mr. Peter Hussey, President and Senior Director, of Strategic Deterrence Studies of GeoStrategic analysis and a senior fellow here at NIDS.

00;02;13;07 - 00;02;15;18

Kimberly Cherington

Peter, the floor is all yours.

00;02;15;20 - 00;02;39;19

Peter Huessy

Thank you very much. Kimberly, want to make a point that... Mr. Hoagland is speaking. He is with the NNSA. The shutdown, we had to kind of put things on pause. We're trying to get some others, but hopefully you'll join us there. And we are honored today to have my friend Bob Peters from the Heritage Foundation. And this is what we're trying to do, in this session is both

to review what have we accomplished this year?

00;02;39;21 - 00;03;07;13

Peter Huessy

But as importantly, as what should we be proposing some guidelines for the coming year, which is just a couple of months. The president's budget is meant to be submitted to Congress. Bob is, you know, the senior nuclear guru over at the Heritage Foundation. He also does missile defense. And so, Bob is going to give us a perspective on both nuclear deterrence and missile defense as to where we have been and where we should be going.

00;03;07;16 - 00;03;14;26

Peter Huessy

And again, Bob, on behalf of NIDS, I want to thank you for joining us today and the floor is yours, sir.

00;03;14;29 - 00;03;38;22

Robert Peters

Thank you, Peter. And thanks. It's, thanks, Kim, for having me. Apologies for the, for the camera malfunction on my end. It's probably a benefit to everyone is out in the audience watching. So, some wins that we had in, this year. I think a lot of that goes to the, the one big, beautiful bill, which had a substantial bump up on top of the top line defense budget.

00;03;38;25 - 00;04;01;01

Robert Peters

And so, you saw some real investments there in trying to expand production lines for some munitions. You saw some wins there when it comes to things like, Golden Dome, it was about \$25 billion there to jumpstart the Golden Dome effort. There were some more money there that was poured into the nuclear enterprise to try to crank out warheads faster.

00;04;01;04 - 00;04;24;06

Robert Peters

There are some more money there for nuke modernization. All good things. But, you know, that's the one big, beautiful bill is kind of a once in a generation thing. I doubt that we're going to see another one of those anytime soon. And so, there were some wins there. And I want to give credit where credit's due.

00;04;24;09 - 00;05;02;16

Robert Peters

But what you did not see was some big realignment within the defense budget itself. And, and so I can talk about that later on about what needs to be done. But we're really at an inflection point where if we're going to actually field the capabilities in the military that we need in order to deter, if necessary, defeat adversary aggression, we need to actually start making some pretty big changes within the within the buckets of the defense budget itself, because the changes that I would submit that need to be done, or two significant to simply pour more money into the budget, we have to start prioritizing.

00;05;02;16 - 00;05;22;12

Robert Peters

And that means picking winners and losers. And so we put out a pretty big study, a few weeks

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ago on what we think the priorities should be for the FY 27 defense budget. And so, I'll just kind of go through some of those things and also talk about where I think we need to go with the with the nuclear arsenal.

00;05;22;14 - 00;05;45;13

Robert Peters

So, the first thing is kind of aligned with the interim national defense guidance, that Secretary Hegseth has put out, and that's to regain preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, particularly when it comes to narco traffickers and, the southern border migrations. There is a role for the War Department to serve in these areas.

00;05;45;15 - 00;06;15;23

Robert Peters

Probably the best way to organize this stuff, particularly when it comes to U.S. operations against cartels, is to reinvigorate the Joint Interact Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South. So, China South, its operational scope is at this point to limited that in order to undermine the efficacy of the cartels. And so what you really need to do is start integrating either south along with China West, if it really wants to be able to take it to the cartels.

00;06;15;26 - 00;06;38;16

Robert Peters

I'm not going to get into the legality of that. I'm not a lawyer, but, if we're going to be doing those strikes, we want to do it successfully. We have to think about strengthening, the, the capabilities of those two..., in order to, to get at the narco traffickers. There is a role, as I said, as well, to support and border security.

00;06;38;18 - 00;07;10;27

Robert Peters

We've seen what's being done with the National Guards and Marines in Los Angeles. But, you know, I would offer that the responsibility should also be extended to the Coast Guard capacity to interdict illegal substances. Also, human trafficking flows into the mainland United States. And I think that, some increased O&M funding for NorthCom and in SouthCom is one of the things that we recommend, on the order of, of, of almost \$1 billion, to support the border security and, and counter narco trafficking efforts.

00;07;10;29 - 00;07;34;24

Robert Peters

That's within the Western Hemisphere. When you start looking at the Indo-Pacific. I think that is and will remain the primary focus of long-term strategic planning. And so, our defense budgets and expenditure should reflect that reality. Previous administrations, both the Biden and the Trump administration's have called China the primary threat or the pacing threat. And I think it's going to remain so for the foreseeable future.

00;07;34;26 - 00;07;58;00

Robert Peters

And so, if you prioritize that resources appropriately, you have to think about China as being a near peer, great power rival. And so, you need to build relative comparative advantages on a scale of industrial production that China has developed over the last decade and a half, that it's really been optimized to threaten us and our allies in the in the theater.

00;07;58;03 - 00;08;21;11

Robert Peters

And so the key to this is going to be, really thinking about expansion and modernization of Navy and Air Force capabilities, because I think they're going to play key deterrence and combat roles and, and therefore should receive an expanded and sustained relative share of the military funding, which means that the Army's budget may have to be reduced or held relatively flat over the FYDP.

00;08;21;11 - 00;08;54;12

Robert Peters

If you're going to expand air, space and maritime capacity. And if you don't see a significant topline increase in defense budget, then this reposition reappropriation is essential to building and advancing, American, comparative advantage over China. And so, you may want to see an army that's restructured, perhaps somewhat smaller. Perhaps they mimic some of the approaches taken by the Marine Corps when they're forced design 2030 in order to represent a viable model, for the Army's role in the Indo-Pacific.

00;08;54;14 - 00;09;17;23

Robert Peters

And I think, as we all know about the Marine Corps, that their forces on I2030 is really to try to introduce modern capabilities tied to Indo-Pacific conflicts. And so, the Corps has really moved away from counterinsurgency plans and capabilities that they used successfully in Iraq, Afghanistan, in order to really think about major theater conflicts, in the Indo-Pacific, on a on a variety of fronts.

00;09;17;25 - 00;09;42;17

Robert Peters

Another big one that we hit is expanding munitions procurement. And I think there was there were some good work done in one Big, Beautiful Bill. But when you look at the baseline budget, there's not nearly enough being done when it comes to munitions procurement. You're seeing, a lot of the unfunded priorities list for the Army, Navy and Air Force showing that they want to need more precision guided munitions.

00;09;42;19 - 00;10;06;21

Robert Peters

It's one of the most common requests for additional funding across the services. And if we're being honest, our munitions stockpiles are running really low as a result of our global commitments and to our support to our allies in the Middle East, particularly Israel, to our support to the war in Ukraine, to us doing, you know, ... Houthis, as well as, you know, a decade and a half of doing operations in the East.

00;10;06;24 - 00;10;32;29

Robert Peters

We simply do not have enough munitions for war in the Indo-Pacific, much less for two major regional conflicts simultaneously. And lots of war games support this. And so, you know, in addition to offensive munitions, we need more Patriot missiles. We need more Thad interceptors. We need a whole lot more SM3s and SM6s.

00;10;33;01 - 00;11;00;06

Robert Peters

We're basically burning these faster than we're producing them in. So, from an air defense perspective, the trend is actually going in the wrong direction. Now, you'll hear this from some defense contractors that the industry can't handle this and orders. And you actually hear this from some folks on the Hill, and therefore the use that as an argument against increased procurement of munitions, any way to expand capacity is to expand the orders.

00;11;00;06 - 00;11;19;16

Robert Peters

And so and so if we have to send a demand signal to industry to invest in long term labor or infrastructure development, if we're going to build more munitions. And so, so what do we need? We need more prisms. We need more pack three missiles. We need more Thad interceptors. We need more long-range anti-ship missiles We need more RASMs

00;11;19;19 - 00;11;42;12

Robert Peters

We need more JSSMs. The naval strike missiles, SM3s and SM6s. We frankly, are really all and work 48 torpedoes to where it is. It sounds, but we are, we need more anti-radiation missiles and AmRams, and I would offer we need to accelerate development to the procurement of the new long range air to air missiles like the and the, the A120 and the AM174 BRAVO.

00;11;42;12 - 00;12;21;07

Robert Peters

So that you we can field your air weapons that have ranges comparable to what the coms have. We need to look at pre-positioning, or reserve materials such as fuel. That's going to be critical in order to enable swift reaction times and force longevity. And I would offer that to send us a clear signal to, of American stake and will to our adversaries if we're if we're for stationing in particular fuel, into the Indo Pacific, just as the Army has done for many decades with pre-positioned stocks in Germany, Belgium, Italy, middle ones, and so forth.

00;12;21;09 - 00;12;47;07

Robert Peters

I would offer that, we should direct the military services to base munitions, request on warfighting requirements, service specific requests for PGMs should be tailored to warfighting requirements based on a definable metric, like a protracted 12 month conflict with China and the Indo-Pacific, not simply what's within the base plan. I think oftentimes the base plans posit, a war in which we win relatively quickly and decisively.

00;12;47;07 - 00;13;11;16

Robert Peters

And I think more and more war games are showing that you could actually have protracted conflict. And if you do have protracted conflict, you're going to need much, much deeper magazines than what we have today. And we need a lot more unsexy stuff. And by unsexy stuff, I mean things like aviation support, logistics, ships. We should probably, you know, accelerate the construction of two more of these things.

00;13;11;18 - 00;13;34;26

Robert Peters

We need a lot more, air refueling tankers, so KC46s. And the Air Force is moving in the right direction on that front, which is good. We need more, heavy strategic lift, long range lift. I would offer that we need a third maritime pre-positioning 4 squadron NPF, which is a program of, of ships that are filled with Marine Corps equipment.

00;13;34;29 - 00;13;55;24

Robert Peters

They're stationed around the world, and they're able to respond rapidly to a crisis. We've got two of these right now. They're designed to link up with. They're supported now, the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. And basically each one of these things have enough equipment and supply for 16,000 Marines for 30 days. If we have a third of these things, I think that would go far.

00;13;55;26 - 00;14;15;02

Robert Peters

To, to help deter adversaries. And if we do need to rock and roll, be able to equip the Marines to, to be able to, initiate combat operations relatively quickly, B21s, I think, General Cotton Stratcom commander, has said that we need at least 145. I would offer that we need about 250.

00;14;15;02 - 00;14;38;15

Robert Peters

I think Hudson has said that we they think we need around 300. I think everyone agrees we need more than 100 B21s at this point. But at the rate we're going of ten per year, we're not going to hit 100 B20 ones until, the late 2030s. Like 2038 at that rate. And that's just to hit 100.

00;14;38;18 - 00;15;04;06

Robert Peters

So, there are some things that you can do at Palmdale, which is the B-21 production facility to do some, improvements on the side, but it's only going to buy about another 20% production rate. So, you're only looking at going from 10 to 12 years, which is good, which is not bad. But really, if you want to have, B-21s built at scale for the US Air Force, you have to be able to build 20, 24 bombers a year.

00;15;04;06 - 00;15;24;18

Robert Peters

And that requires building a second facility. And so, one of the things we call for in our defense budget is, giving money to build a, to Northrop to build a second B-21 production facility. The other the other good thing there is, if you got a second facility, is if the bad guys, you know, bought the facility in Palmdale, you've got to back up.

00;15;24;21 - 00;15;49;12

Robert Peters

Right. You're not spending five years to reconstitute Palmdale. I'll talk more about modernizing the nuclear triad in a bit more depth, but, I think we need to continue the investments in those areas. And so, in addition to increased funding for B-21 production Sentinel, ICBM. And SLCM-N are going to need additional funding if we're going to get them out on time.

00;15;49;14 - 00;16;14;29

Robert Peters

And I also, offer that, that the FY 27 budget, should look at uploading additional warheads to the ICBM force, probably on the order of another 400 warheads. So, so basically doubling the load out of what we've got right now in the ICBM leg of the triad. I would offer that we need to prioritize funding for programs that enable core Air Force missions of air superiority and goal strike.

00;16;15;01 - 00;16;39;20

Robert Peters

And so therefore, in addition to B-21, we should continue to prioritize funding for F47. And... that goes with the KC 46s as well. Readiness is continues to be an issue. And so, you know, readiness depends on having the right mix of... maintenance capability and, and hours of fly time per pilot and aircrew.

00;16;39;22 - 00;17;03;00

Robert Peters

And the, the number of hours it's been flown, an actual aircraft has been going down over the last 26 years. And at the same time, the..., the Chinese Air Force, they've been getting more and more flight hours. And so, what we offer is spend less time on the simulator and more time, in a cockpit, operating stack for the pilots.

00;17;03;03 - 00;17;32;00

Robert Peters

We should prioritize the deployment of kinetic counter UAS systems. The advanced precision kill weapon system has been used effectively in demonstrations and the ... Lightweight multi-role missile. The element is designed for multi-domain warfare. And it's great because you can you can fire it from land, air or city. DEWs maybe promising, district energy weapons, but their energy needs are pretty robust and their range is....

00;17;32;02 - 00;18;04;16

Robert Peters

And so and so we offer that why we should continue to do some research on directed energy. We should really prioritize, counter UAS systems. Subs! We're not doing nearly well enough on subs. And so we say the minimal threshold should be ordering three Virginia class subs per year. They're integral to the Indo-Pacific strategy. And if Aukus pillar one is going to work, you have to have a submarine industrial base that is not subject to the to the very serious toys that we have right now.

00;18;04;19 - 00;18;34;03

Robert Peters

And so, to send a demand signal to industry and spur investments, labor and infrastructure, Congress really needs to expand. The Virginia class ordered at three a year, at a minimum for the next few years. 3.5 would be better. New contracting mechanisms like shipyard accountability and workforce support, effort or SAWs, could enable the workforce improvements and capital investments that are needed to grow shipbuilding capacity.

00;18;34;05 - 00;19;07;10

Robert Peters

By 2030. It's projected that, we will have a dearth of 400,000 engineers in America. And a big

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chunk of those will go to the defense industrial base for what we need. And so, if you actually want to have pillar one of succeed, you actually need for Congress to get involved and, incentivizing the shipbuilders to, to produce, more subs.

00;19;07;13 - 00;19;26;23

Robert Peters

We need a modern naval act. The Navy is continuing to shrink in size. We're going in the wrong direction. And so, and there's a lot of reasons for this, which is, you know, the, the dearth of shipbuilding in America or the death of shipbuilding in America, the Jones act, all this plays into it.

00;19;26;23 - 00;19;56;07

Robert Peters

And so and so we have to do a sizable block by, to take advantage of economies of scale and reduce construction costs. This will enable us, have better workforce planning and appropriate tax incentives to help ensure that capital investments are made at naval shipyards and increase shipbuilding capacity. Such a buy would fund the procurement of our warships at a stable design, through the through the FYDP and but would not be cheap right.

00;19;56;07 - 00;20;25;13

Robert Peters

And you're talking about at least \$150 billion. I mean, we've bought a metal. We need to get as many new warships as possible funded, through, not only reconciliation, which is the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, but also going with a separate naval act to, to really get this thing rock and rolling. I mean, fundamentally, if you want more ships, you have to buy more ships and to buy more ships, you have to order new ships sustained over at least ten years.

00;20;25;16 - 00;20;49;15

Robert Peters

It may be time to reestablish the First Fleet. In a conflict with China, the Navy must be able to establish foreign presence and sustainment capabilities within the theater. And so we offer that \$60 million to be allocated for a modest reestablishment of the First Fleet, First Fleet, with a focus on conducting a maritime campaign to counter Chinese coercive activities, primarily in the South China Sea.

00;20;49;18 - 00;21;13;26

Robert Peters

And he could also use this as really a means to advance the AUKUS partnership. Talk about I mean, I'm happy to talk more about AUKUS. There's a lot of good stuff happening when it comes to, you know, the bases and doing MRO in Perth. But I but I but I don't want to go too far down rental.

00;21;13;29 - 00;21;45;13

Robert Peters

I think we need additional shipyards. We should break ground on a fifth public shipyard. Right now, there are four. Nuclear maintenance is behind schedule. Despite effort since 2018 to modernize and optimize the shipyards. As part of the shipyard infrastructure optimization program, or Psyop. And Congress really needs to be notified of the selection of the site by the Secretary of the Navy and say, well, this is where we want to go, whether that's at Hunter's

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Point and Services go Bay, or whether that's in Alabama or Jacksonville.

00;21;45;18 - 00;22;11;14

Robert Peters

But, you know, we need to invest about \$10 billion to get this shipyard up and rock and roll and, if we need a second shipyard for the constellation class frigates constellations, it's a good ship. It's had a number of delays. It's not really the fault of the ship itself. But at this point, we need at least 20 constellations.

00;22;11;16 - 00;22;34;18

Robert Peters

And at this, at this at this time, the program is delayed. And so, I think we need a second shipyard to really be cranking out, the constellations. Golden dome, I think it's possible that we could see at 20, 26, initial test of certain space based interceptors and then a proof of concept test by 2028.

00;22;34;20 - 00;22;59;16

Robert Peters

But that's going to need continued investment to make that thing, to make that thing work. I think part of that is going to be, adoption of commercial space capabilities. That's the only way we can get Golden Dome to work, particularly the space over where I talked earlier about trying to reprioritize investments. I think it's time to eliminate non-defense research and development programs.

00;22;59;18 - 00;23;34;12

Robert Peters

Right. And the Cold War was that was that 1 to 3 against procurements. That is for every \$3 we spent on procurements, we spent \$1. And today that ratio today is almost 1 to 1. We're spending more money on RDT&E than all in the totality of the British military spends and their annual budget. Even if we cut routinely back to \$100 billion, that would still be enough money to fund, the fund F47 to fund B-21 to fund Golden Dome, etc. and you'd be able to shift about \$50 billion into procurement.

00;23;34;14 - 00;23;57;23

Robert Peters

And so that's a big area. So now I'm going to talk about where I think the Arsenal needs to go very briefly. Bottom line up front, we need to be looking at a multi-decade program to build the arsenal of the 21st century. And by that I mean at Arsenal 4625 operationally deployed weapons, both strategic and non-strategic, spread across three different theaters.

00;23;57;25 - 00;24;27;05

Robert Peters

And so, what is that Arsenal future? We need Sentinel ICBMs. We need nuclear capable bombers for the B-21 being the backbone of the bomber leg of the triad, I would offer that we need 16 Columbia SSBNs F-35 by all means and sure, sure nuclear gravity bombs we will need LRSOs SLCM-Ns. But we're going to need other nuclear cruise missiles, such as a small number of anti-ship cruise missiles or grand launch nuclear cruise missiles.

00;24;27;08 - 00;24;55;13

Robert Peters

I think we also need to be looking at Pershing three squadrons, grand launch missiles that can carry nuclear warheads on them, as well as hypersonic missiles. Because and the reason for all this is you want the ability to have a number of characteristics in your arsenal. Visible generation, non-visible generation, ballistic trajectory, not ballistic Secretary. They of course you've got to have a mix that is survivable deployable, responsive penetrating standoff low yield and high yield.

00;24;55;13 - 00;25;19;08

Robert Peters

And then that can be generated from air, sea and land domains both strategic and strategic. And that's why you have a much larger diversity of force than what we have today, which is essentially only, you know, a handful of warheads on a very small number of delivery platforms. And I said, these should be spread throughout three theaters, NorthCom, into PayCom, and UCom.

00;25;19;11 - 00;25;46;04

Robert Peters

Bottom line is, is basically, NorthCom's got the strategic weapons of a small number of non-strategic and then Indo PayCom and UCom have primarily non-strategic weapons. And so, what you've got basically in Indo pay common you com in a pay com and have roughly 100 non-strategic gravity assigned to it.

00;25;46;06 - 00;26;14;03

Robert Peters

You comms got about 200 non-strategic gravity bombs. And that's, that's because of the different nature of the threat and the different geography terrain. I think both Indo pay com and you call them needs about 200 or so cruise missiles. And both theaters, probably about 200 SLCM-Ns their inventory, primarily based on SSNs, but potentially also, service combatants as well.

00;26;14;05 - 00;26;37;12

Robert Peters

I would offer that in the Indo PayCom and UCom both should roughly have 50 nuclear armed theater range hypersonic missiles such as LRHWN as well as 50 each of the of a nuclear armed ground launch cruise missiles. So so talking about GLCMs, and 50 on on GLNMs as well. I would offer that opaque probably needs 25 LRZMs.

00;26;37;12 - 00;27;09;24

Robert Peters

And it's given the robust threat picture of the PLA Navy. And so so you do the math and then roughly a Indo pay com should have roughly, 675 nuclear weapons in theater as opposed to zero today in Indo paycom, which would field roughly 750 ones. From from roughly 150 today. So, this would be significant increases from what the US has today, given that there are no non strategic weapons in theater.

00;27;09;26 - 00;27;35;03

Robert Peters

As I said IndoPayCom, when you look at the, the, the strategic arsenal, as I said, I think it's hard

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to upload the ICBM force. I think we need a small number, say 50 or so, road mobile Sentinels that will put it out with three warheads apiece. And then you've got 16 Columbia's, would it out with with with 16 tubes.

00;27;35;09 - 00;28;14;19

Robert Peters

So you do the math all in. You're looking at about a strategic arsenal of about 3100...3200 weapons. That gets you roughly all in to about 4625 nuclear weapons by 2050. It's ambitious. And that's gonna require significant change within within the nuclear enterprise. And, I will say that I'm not sure we're seeing a lot of urgency within NNSA and say, I think culturally and I'm not just trying to throw a rocks at NNSA I think we have a similar problem within the Department of War is that there's not a great sense of urgency, within the services, within the civilian workforce at the Pentagon.

00;28;14;22 - 00;28;38;13

Robert Peters

Same as a nuclear enterprise. I think there's a sense of we'll get there when we get there. And and no one's foolish enough to actually try to take on the United States in a straight up fight. And if they did, we win that war. But I would offer that. When you look at the budget or the number of ships that we have, and you look at number of missile sectors that we have, we look at the number of air refueling tankers that we have, and you look at the number of precision guided munitions that we have.

00;28;38;13 - 00;29;02;16

Robert Peters

We look at the number of attack submarines. When you look at the number of MK48 torpedoes that we have, when you look at, how China and Russia have modernized and are expanding their nuclear arsenal, you know, Russia is doing these, you know, bonkers novel nuclear capabilities that may or may not be real. But, you know, our newest warhead is still was still built in 1989.

00;29;02;19 - 00;29;28;08

Robert Peters

And so, I'm not sure we're on a path to success. I think the president is correct in what he's trying to do and revitalize, rebuild the military. I think that a number of the people who work for him as political appointees get it. They're trying to move in the right direction. I see, I think certain members of Congress, particularly Senator Wicker, certain others, such as Senator Sullivan and Senator Fisher, get it.

00;29;28;10 - 00;29;46;29

Robert Peters

But I'm not sure that your average GS13 or your average three star gets it. And so I'm a bit pessimistic, and we have to be moving with a sense of urgency because if we don't have a sense of urgency, I'm I'm afraid we're on a path to lose a war. So I'll stop there. I know that's a bunch.

00;29;46;29 - 00;29;53;11

Robert Peters

And, Peter, I'm happy to take the conversation of wherever you'd like to take it.

00;29;53;14 - 00;30;21;29

Peter Huessy

Thank you very much, Bob. I really appreciate it. I put some questions in here, which you've addressed in part, but I know from talking to people is that what would what is Heritage recommending that we do particularly what can Congress do. But in general, to expand the industrial base because a lot of the industry people tell me that they're short, a lot of skilled labor, and they're in the process of getting that.

00;30;22;01 - 00;30;32;23

Peter Huessy

But it's not an easy thing when we're not graduating such people, as you mentioned, industrial engineers and so forth. So what would what is Heritage recommending there?

00;30;32;25 - 00;30;53;17

Robert Peters

So that's one of the things, I mean, that's one of the things we're still formulating. And I think part of it is, is kind of deregulating, the industry, and that that helps. But that doesn't get the fundamental problem of people. It's a real problem. I will say that I have a 15 year old son, and I took him down.

00;30;53;17 - 00;31;27;08

Robert Peters

I took him down to a local community college. And because we live in southern Maryland, not far from Pax River Naval Air Station and the local community college has a program to train two year associates degrees in which you can go and get a job with the contractor or control impact River doing stuff down there. Well, that's good, but then if you get after two years, you want to stay on, you can get a four year degree at the University of Maryland, College Park, which is a top 15 engineering program in the country.

00;31;27;11 - 00;31;52;28

Robert Peters

And you're automatically enrolled there. And you can get a degree in mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, computer engineering, aeronautical engineering, you name it. And then you get your four year degree at College Park. You're almost guaranteed a job with the Navy in Southern Maryland, earning 80 K a year. And so for a 22 year old kid, that's a pretty darn good deal, right?

00;31;53;00 - 00;32;14;15

Robert Peters

Earning 80 K. Or if you don't do the four year degree, you still get a pretty good, associate degree, which there's still a dearth of those guys as well. And so this is a partnership between the state of Maryland and the Navy, because they see that they simply do not have enough young people entering the pipeline with background skills in this type of engineering.

00;32;14;20 - 00;32;33;07

Robert Peters

I think those types of partnerships are the things that we have to be looking at if we actually want to grow the bench. And I was there and with my son, and he was there with the gaggle of

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his friends. And these were young men, you know, boys who are actually excited about going to work for the Navy 7 or 8 years down the line.

00;32;33;09 - 00;32;50;23

Robert Peters

And I think those are things that we have to start getting more creative for. So I don't have a good answer for that. We don't have a formal, rec, recommendation for that, but but boy, was that an interesting program that, that hopefully we're starting to see more of. And this is a program that was a star started only three years ago.

00;32;50;26 - 00;33;16;22

Peter Huessy

So no, I'm it's it's something that was suggested. I think the first time I heard it was about 7 or 8 years ago at a conference in, Connecticut, at the Navy base and something the Navy was looking at is, is how this industry cultivate young people to go into the jobs they need. And then at the end of the day, they graduate without any debt.

00;33;16;25 - 00;33;43;05

Peter Huessy

And they have to they have to make a commitment, like you do in the military of a certain amount of time you spend with the company. We heard from Don cook, former NNSA, last week. And one of the interesting things he pointed out is that the seven warhead supersonic extension program programs are all on time and under budget, and for NNSA that's a pretty extraordinary achievement.

00;33;43;08 - 00;34;02;09

Peter Huessy

And it's been done over a number of administrations. Does heritage have a recommendation with respect to how to both speed up acquisition within the Department of Defense or Department war, but also to begin getting control of the cost of acquisition itself?

00;34;02;11 - 00;34;39;18

Robert Peters

Yeah, I mean, I mean, a lot of the costs for acquisition comes from, these extended timelines for, for program reviews, and acquisition and contracting. And so when you look at things like SR71. SR71 went from, an idea that was sketched out on paper to actually first flight within 18 months. And basically what you had was a small number of people, starting to sign the paperwork and saying, go, do and go build.

00;34;39;21 - 00;35;07;00

Robert Peters

And what you've seen since then is, a rise of of a civilian bureaucracy that is there to implement the regs, not actually ensure that programs get, turned and move in with alacrity. And I'm not just trying to like you know, poke fingers at GS12, GS13, which are good people. But they don't have a sense of urgency because they haven't been told to move with a sense of urgency.

00;35;07;03 - 00;35;27;15

Robert Peters

So I think part of this is trying to instill a culture of urgency, which has to come from the top

down. But part of this is also is trying to remove the environmental regulations and the and to some degree, some workplace safety regulations as well, so that you can move faster on building this stuff and therefore fielding this stuff.

00;35;27;17 - 00;35;58;27

Robert Peters

The, the testing and evaluation periods in many cases are too long to onerous. And so what we've done is basically we've accepted very little tactical risk of some type of workplace accident or industrial accident or so forth. But the consequence of that is we're accepting greater and greater strategic risk of not getting stuff filled in on time or in a time frame that's going to be ready to deter, you know, Chinese or, Russian attack.

00;35;58;29 - 00;36;24;10

Robert Peters

And that has to change. And so a lot of what of, of what we recommend is that the department secretaries, both in the Palmer's War and the Department of Energy, start using, using their power to wave to wave regulations. And, and again, we're talking about regulations, not laws that, that they have, that within their power to wave.

00;36;24;17 - 00;36;36;17

Robert Peters

... and I did a piece on this back in March of 24. What can be done specifically within NNSA so I, I recommend, you know, people check that out if they're interested.

00;36;36;20 - 00;36;58;29

Robert Peters

Very interesting Bob. But, as someone who worked for five senators, I'm kind of biased towards looking at things from the perspective of the Hill. And my question to you is, what are the congressional roadblocks do you think still exist to you mentioned getting Golden Dome tested in deployed.

00;36;59;01 - 00;37;04;27

Robert Peters

I, I'm not sure that there's a lot of congressional roadblocks. I think that.

00;37;04;29 - 00;37;06;09

Robert Peters

That's good news.

00;37;06;12 - 00;37;33;29

Robert Peters

Yeah, I don't think I think actually like when you look at what Senator Sullivan and Senator Cramer have done, preventative measure, Senator Banks have done, it actually cleared a lot of those road roadblocks. And so I think Joe Biden has the authorities that he needs, like he's been given a tremendous amount of power. He's still building up his staff because the money was just, I think, just released, to get to get things rock and roll.

00;37;33;29 - 00;37;54;20

Robert Peters

And his my understanding is that his approach is kind of the white 1000 flowers bloom, which at a certain level is good, but I actually think that I would offer that General... should provide a little bit more direction to industry and say, this is this is what we want to see from an architecture perspective. And then they go and come up with solutions.

00;37;54;20 - 00;38;16;00

Robert Peters

And I think that they're, I think that she's it's just a mild critique. I think he's being a little too passive. And for an industry proposed architecture, which is going to be harder to adjudicate which, which, which looks good. I think if you were to be more directive, that would actually help industry and speed some things up that would be the one thing I would say.

00;38;16;02 - 00;38;26;14

Robert Peters

I think there's a lot of promise that's been coming out, particularly for space-based interceptors, that companies like Lockheed and others have already come up with. Which is a good news story.

00;38;26;16 - 00;38;50;17

Peter Huessy

We mentioned earlier when we were talking, Bob, about what's your sense is the ability of the government, large in the intelligence community to correctly assess emerging threats, because some of the assumptions are that we'll know when something when the bad guys are going to do something bad and that our capabilities are such that we can then defeat that.

00;38;50;20 - 00;39;03;17

Peter Huessy

Hopefully. But you mentioned one of the things is you think this is an area that we need some, I don't know, reform or better thinking. We'll take it from there.

00;39;03;19 - 00;39;29;23

Robert Peters

Yeah, I think, you know, so we don't have a tremendously great track record when, you know, knowing when someone's about to attack or there's going to be a, you know, someone's about to strike. And there there are some cases where we've gotten some strategic, some, some strategic, threat assessment that says, you know, the Russians are going to invade Ukraine and we get a few months strategic warning that that's going to come.

00;39;29;25 - 00;39;49;00

Robert Peters

But then there's a political decision to be made that says, okay, well, now we need to take some actions like we're going to we're going to forward for, for deploy some forces. We're going to for the tip fit, or we're going to arm the local government and give them a whole ton of, of a long range strike or anti-air or capabilities or so forth.

00;39;49;02 - 00;40;11;19

Robert Peters

And so, this idea that we will have exquisite strategic warning and then we will take make a political decision within that window and then float forces or whatever is required in the theater

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to deter or if necessary, defeat an adversary invasion. It's not great. Like, like all the a lot of things have to go right for that to work.

00;40;11;19 - 00;40;35;17

Robert Peters

And so our ability to foresee when threats or imminent and then take the right actions, it's not a great track record. And so that's why I, I think that we need a lot more stuff for deployed, particularly within the Indo-Pacific, so that if we don't have that kind of strategic warning, we're able to conduct operations relatively short order.

00;40;35;20 - 00;41;12;02

Peter Huessy

Good. This is a question that it came up, but it always comes up and that is that it's in the movie dynamite. It's in the movie, up in armor. It's all through. Any sources book on nuclear war is that our missile defense tests are scripted. And I just say parenthetically, all our tests of every weapon system is scripted to the extent that you just don't do it willy nilly in the middle of the Pacific or the Atlantic and, you know, don't have to worry about ships and boats that are around or that or airplanes that are around that might be armed.

00;41;12;08 - 00;41;19;08

Peter Huessy

So are the tests. Are the test scripted? And does that mean that they're not realistic?

00;41;19;11 - 00;41;42;21

Robert Peters

Well, I mean, you're right. It's not like when we test, you know, an agent system that that you've got a ship captain out at sea and, and somebody else in his surface action group wanted to send anti-ship missile at him. And that's a real world, you know, that's a non-scripted test. Like they know. So. Right. We're going to we're going to test the system and that sends it to script to test.

00;41;42;24 - 00;42;12;01

Robert Peters

And that's in many ways how the missile defense tests are run. What I would say is that the tests have gotten much, much better with much higher degree of efficacy in the last few years. But moreover, like, I'm far less interested in that than the real world combat environment in which we've seen missile defenses work with breathtaking efficacy in Israel and Ukraine.

00;42;12;03 - 00;42;46;06

Robert Peters

And so we've had... atmospheric successful intercepts of ballistic missiles from a ground based interceptor. I think it was a fad that shot it down against Israel. I think it was Israel, you know, did an exo atmospheric intercept of an Iranian ballistic missile. And so it turns out you actually can't hit a bullet with a bullet. And so I really don't have a lot of sympathy for these people who still who still in the year of our Lord, 2025 are saying you can't hit a bullet with a bullet.

00;42;46;14 - 00;42;57;19

Robert Peters

And these tests are scripted and missile defense doesn't work like I just I think those people at

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this point are, are having difficulty, grasping reality.

00;42;57;22 - 00;43;26;17

Peter Huessy

Well, that that's what's interesting. A recent article appeared that took on the idea that the Israelis had said that what we've of those missiles and drones and rockets that we've engaged, we've shot down 95% of them. And the argument in the article was, well, if you really do it and you take a an area where Iran saturated the skies with this stuff, you only shot down 86%.

00;43;26;20 - 00;43;27;08

Robert Peters

Yeah.

00;43;27;10 - 00;43;52;08

Peter Huessy

It was it was over over a period of about two weeks. And then the Iranians ran out of missiles because the Iranian, the Israelis had wiped out their launchers, which is quite interesting. So anyway, it's it's I'm fascinated by the fact that Israel's had 30,000 rockets, drones and missiles launched at them over about a 15 month period in which they shot down about 95% of those in engage.

00;43;52;08 - 00;44;12;10

Peter Huessy

Now, if the rocket was going to go in the ocean or land in a in an area that wasn't built up, that was just not going to harm anything, they didn't engage it because why why waste intercept, which is quite interesting. I'm going to turn it over to our vice president, Curtis, who had a question with respect to air superiority and long range strike.

00;44;12;16 - 00;44;33;15

Peter Huessy

Curtis, if you're there, I'll let you talk to Bob about what question you had and any others that you might.

Curtis McGiffin

Thanks, Peter. I don't want to take too much with other folks when I have questions. I think, great presentation. Thanks, Bob. I guess my question here is, given the, the new chief of staff of the Air Force,

00;44;33;17 - 00;44;33;29

Curtis McGiffin

What is your confidence in the prioritization of air superiority, versus, long range strike when we're thinking about, you know, can we afford both? What do we need first? And these sorts of things, as we are looking forward to 2027, 2030 and 2035?

00;44;52;17 - 00;45;18;28

Robert Peters

I mean, I don't I certainly don't speak for the for the incoming, for the chief. I mean, he's an air superiority guy, and I'm all for air superiority guys, I am, but we've basically already have, the greatest, you know, fighter, in the world in the F-35 Alpha, which is a great platform. And, and I,

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you know, I want to continue that, I fully support pulling the 47.

00;45;19;01 - 00;45;49;02

Robert Peters

But I think so many possibilities open up if we have a B-21. That so so the problem with with fighters and if we're operating in the western Pacific is, is the range issue, and they're going to have to be doing air refueling, given where our bases are in the western Pacific. So they're going to be generating out of Kadena or out of Anderson primarily, or if they're generating beyond Kadena, then you're going to have to do an air refueling.

00;45;49;02 - 00;46;28;10

Robert Peters

And so that's going to put a real challenge on our air refueling, on our air refueling side of the house, if you've got a B-21 with a very significant range, and if you had enough of them, then you've got the ability to attack targets deep in Central Asia for multiple axes, right? So you could actually generate strikes out of Europe, out of Diego, out of northern Australia and Japan, which creates real dilemmas for China from an air defense perspective, drop a significant number of ordnance on whatever targets you want to hit, potentially even do it in air to air mission using B20 ones.

00;46;28;12 - 00;46;56;29

Robert Peters

Nobody knows actually what the B20 ones capability is going to be, but there's a pretty good amount of speculation that it's going to have some modicum of air to air capabilities. Then what you can do is still have a fight in the Western Pacific. You know, with F-35s potentially at 40 sevens against the path, while the B-21 is is is taken China to the woodshed, in the central part of their, the central part of their nation, which today they believe is sanctuary.

00;46;57;02 - 00;47;25;22

Robert Peters

And so and so you know, the Air Force is all in on my 47, which is great. And again, I support a 47. But I really do think that you have that once you get to a point of between 250 to 300 B20 ones in the American fleet, and then again, I'm very open to having a conversation at about, you know, an Australian or a Japanese or a Polish B-21 arsenal.

00;47;25;24 - 00;47;52;29

Robert Peters

That in a world of possibilities open up for you, which that I think makes the air superiority mission from the American side that much stronger, right. Because you're forcing the Chinese to spread out their resources and their defenses all over their country, as opposed to the coast. And so, and so I, I tend to lean a bit more towards the bomber side myself, and I hope that the Air Force takes a hard look at this.

00;47;53;02 - 00;48;01;06

Robert Peters

Two statements of General Cotton and others who have said we need a significantly larger B-21 bae than the one we have right now.

Curtis McGiffin - Fascinating response. Thank you so much, Peter. Back to you. Maybe we've

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got time for one out of the audience here.

00;48;01;08 - 00;48;27;15

Peter Huessy

We have a question from our friend, Brian Groft from the Systems Planning and Analysis. One of our sponsors. I want to thank you, Brian, for all the wonderful support we get. But here's the, I read the question is people want to rely on the idea that testing a weapons is for NNSA's job, but where do they get the requirements?

00;48;27;15 - 00;48;47;06

Peter Huessy

And his point was that the Secretary of War needs to drive the urgency on your points that you made bomb, but is there a necessity to have a change in requirements so that the various parts of the defense establishment move better in the right direction?

00;48;47;08 - 00;49;06;17

Robert Peters

I, yeah, thanks. Great question, Brian. I think so, and I think we actually need I think I've, I myself have been a bit of a journey when it comes to testing. And so, you know, I said almost a year ago that we needed to be prepared to conduct a nuclear test. I always talked myself into the point where we should start testing again.

00;49;06;17 - 00;49;27;00

Robert Peters

And the reason for that is is twofold. One is what it calls as a means that to send a message of credibility and stake. But two, there's a technical reason. So and so let's think of a nuclear weapon as, as a car. Right now we've got, say, a 1975 Cadillac. Right. That's the analog to the arsenal that we have now.

00;49;27;02 - 00;49;52;17

Robert Peters

And it's been kept in the garage. It's never been driven. We've replaced the spark plugs and the brake pads and the battery and so forth, but we've never driven a Cadillac. If if the the survival of your nation is predicated upon that Cadillac being able to drive from Chicago to Los Angeles without breaking down, wouldn't you want to drive it around the block a couple times?

00;49;52;19 - 00;50;15;05

Robert Peters

Right. What do you want it to drive it from Chicago to Milwaukee and then back before you took it all the way to Los Angeles, over the Rocky Mountains and so forth. If the survival of your nation was, was, was the steak, I would offer? Yes. And similarly, if we're building the new 2030 Cadillac El Camino or whatever, right.

00;50;15;07 - 00;50;37;17

Robert Peters

And the survival of your nation was predicated upon that 2030 working and then somebody at NNSA and say said, we don't need to drive the 2030 Cadillac. We've we've got this great. I voted in simulation capability. And guess what the AI says that Cadillac is going to work. We

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don't need to test drive it. That's not how.

00;50;37;19 - 00;51;00;21

Robert Peters

That's where the motor company does it, right? Anytime GM or BMW or Toyota comes out with a new vehicle, they test drive that sucker like, and that is to sell a freaking car. Like why we would not test drive a new weapons design when the fate of the nation. And so that way is predicated upon that design working.

00;51;00;23 - 00;51;20;13

Robert Peters

Why we would be satisfied with well the I says it's going to work. So I think we're fine. Like that's not satisfying to me. So I've kind of like talked myself into leave political will and steak aside, I think it's just time for us to test. And if the requirements need to come from D.O.D., then so be it.

00;51;20;16 - 00;51;44;14

Peter Huessy

Understood I will. I'm going to have Kimberly share with you, Don Cook's remarks, last week in which he, answered that very question. You're asking is that, about why, in his view, we don't need to test it. It's an interesting, discussion, but I'm. I'm, if you asked me today what I would do, I would defer to the experts with that one.

00;51;44;14 - 00;52;08;23

Peter Huessy

But anyway, we have another question. And this is something I've got spent the last 50 years on and off working on. And that is if you're going to enhance the protection of our ICBM force, would you make some of it mobile? Or as my friend Mark Schneider has pointed out, why not defend it with missile defense? Since you're going to build a missile defense anyway?

00;52;08;25 - 00;52;39;29

Robert Peters

I mean, I always go for why not both? And I think you can do both. And I think part of Golden Dome again is to deny a limited coercive threat or a limited pathway attack. And so in that sense then yes, I would I think also, Eli Glickman, who's a young man, he did a pretty good piece on the utility of doing, of doing some closing missile defenses, around some of the missile silos that could really create dilemmas for adversaries.

00;52;39;29 - 00;53;04;24

Robert Peters

And that's good. And we should be doing more of that type of thinking, but I but I want to do a road mobile signal variant simply because I want to hedge against the day in which the Columbia may no longer be undetectable. And if you posit that the Columbia's supposed to be operating until 2080, we have to posit that it's also going to be under tactical until 2080.

00;53;04;26 - 00;53;32;27

Robert Peters

That's a pretty good bet. And that may or that that may, may be true or it may work, but it may not work. And so if by 2065, somebody, you know, the neo Ottoman Republic comes up with a way to detect or suspends, I want to have some other undetectable way or some other assured

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second strike capability, which is why I support a modest road mobile Sentinel option as well.

00;53;32;29 - 00;54;00;03

Peter Huessy

It's an interesting one. I were, working that the Reagan administration and we working on, peacekeeper and rail garrison. Peacekeeper? I spent a lot of time with somebody named Senator Al Gore and his staffer, Leon Fuerth, that used to work for less. Aspin, who was chairman of the House Armed Services Committee because the lessons from Wisconsin, we had, maps of Wisconsin railroads.

00;54;00;05 - 00;54;27;16

Peter Huessy

r 2And the senator said, well, if we had 15 minutes to put the train on the road, on the rail tracks at eight miles an hour, how much area would need to be saturated with bombarded with nuclear warheads in order to make it should use it. The trains would be knocked over because the air pressure and the numbers start getting up in the thousands so quickly is that it is a remarkable.

00;54;27;19 - 00;54;55;07

Peter Huessy

And all you need is tracks going to like two directions because the bad guy is going to have to, bombard the area both north and south of where your train is garrisoned, or east and west, depending on what your track is. So it is it is use up warheads very quickly from the bad guy. Yeah. I'm, I'm in favor of that rather than, multiple protective shelters like we tried to do during what we looked at during the 1970s.

00;54;55;09 - 00;55;16;11

Peter Huessy

And, it was we had to move most of the we have to use most of the water in the West, as well as moving, the Earth, equivalent to, like, Mount Everest. It was like a an incredible, messy job. But again, I know my my friends at Sentinel, they're not crazy about going mobile because of the.

00;55;16;13 - 00;55;29;28

Peter Huessy

There's a sense that everybody in your grandmother will come out of the woodwork and and oppose it. So we're a little over time. But let me ask you one more question from Brian. Should DITRA wargame the mobile ICBM problem?

00;55;30;01 - 00;55;32;09

Robert Peters

Yes, yes, because.

00;55;32;12 - 00;55;33;16

Peter Huessy

That's pretty simple.

00;55;33;19 - 00;56;00;07

Robert Peters

We have all these people. We have all these people that say, well, you know, the Russian

Spetsnaz would be like out hunting it and so forth. And I'm like, you know what? Like we got some if we got some, like road mobile sentinels that are in a convoy that are being protected by some Air Force, some some Air Force dudes, they're gonna see some Russians hanging out in Alaska or Montana or wherever these things are on surrogates, I think they'll be able to pick out the Russians or the Chinese are and, like, address that threat.

00;56;00;09 - 00;56;20;22

Robert Peters

So, like, I just think that, like, you know, a drone can take out the Sentinel. Okay. Well, like, I don't think these drones can do what you think they can do. Like, there's a lot of. So. Yeah. Like. Yeah, by all means, let's wargame road mobile. Like if the bad guys think they're worth doing. I don't know why we're so quick to dismiss road mobile ICBMs.

00;56;20;24 - 00;56;48;08

Peter Huessy

Well, real to me is you've already got the. What, are you going to drive it on a road it conjures up. Are they going to be on a new state highway? Well, yes, we do move nuclear warheads around around our interstate highways. Quite often actually, I understand that. But rail is actually you have to have a security car, you have to have a launch car, and you have to have a C cubed and national nuke group command and control and communication car.

00;56;48;13 - 00;57;10;24

Peter Huessy

So, it does run into money in terms of personnel. But you're right. Is that it would it would be so difficult for the bad guys even if they could find submarines, which I don't think they believe in. And I think that that's a not insurmountable but close the problem. But it's an insurance policy that is worth worth buying.

00;57;10;24 - 00;57;23;28

Peter Huessy

And I might, I hope our friends at DITRA would wargame, both rail and road mobile and see what they come up with, because it has been some years since we looked at that.

00;57;24;00 - 00;57;25;24

Robert Peters

Yeah, yeah.

00;57;25;26 - 00;57;42;24

Peter Huessy

Kimberly, we have a few minutes over, but, we actually started, 10:05, so we're we actually now we're just toast. What's next week? And anything else you want to say and we'll take it away.

00;57;42;27 - 00;58;09;24

Kimberly Cherington

Yes. Thank you everyone. First, I want to apologize for our technology, issues today. But what a great talk. Bob, made up for all of that and brought us good will back. So thank you very much. Thanks, Bob, for helping us bring this topic to a broader audience. And if you're new to this, we're a 501 C3 organization, and please learn more about us by coming to Thinkdeterrence.com.

00;58;09;26 - 00;58;32;18

Kimberly Cherington

And we will see you, for our next forum which will be on December 5th. Please reach out with any thoughts you have on our seminars. We I will be sending a survey out and I'll have this transcript and, the video ready for you in the next few days. So thanks a lot for coming. And we hope a peaceful day.

00;58;32;18 - 00;58;39;08

Peter Huessy

Happy Thanksgiving. Yes, everybody, enjoy your family and friends.