

## **National Institute for Deterrence Studies & Peter Huessy Seminar**

### **Nuclear Priorities for Trump 2.0 with Dr. Matthen Kroenig**

September 19, 2025 at 10:00-11:00 AM (Eastern)

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#### **Webinar Transcript**

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#### **Abstract**

This Huessy Seminar, hosted by the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), features Dr. Matthew Kroenig, Vice President of the Atlantic Council and Senior Director of the Scowcroft Center, discussing the evolving nuclear priorities under a potential second Trump administration. Moderated by Kimberly Cherington and Peter Huessy, the event explores the strategic implications of deterring two near-peer nuclear powers—Russia and China—amid growing global threats. Dr. Kroenig outlines recommendations from the Strategic Posture Commission, including modernization of strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces, enhancements to missile defense, and the challenges facing arms control and nonproliferation. The seminar concludes with a robust Q&A session addressing China’s nuclear buildup, U.S. posture toward India and Pakistan, and long-term strategies for bipartisan success in nuclear policy.

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#### **Executive Summary**

The seminar, moderated by Peter Huessy, featured keynote speaker Dr. Matthew Kroenig, Vice President of the Atlantic Council and Senior Director of the Scowcroft Center. The discussion focused on anticipated nuclear policy directions under a potential second Trump administration, emphasizing a stronger prioritization of nuclear deterrence.

#### **Key Themes and Insights:**

- **Strategic Posture and Threat Environment:**
  - The U.S. faces an increasingly dangerous nuclear landscape, with China’s rapid buildup projected to reach 1,500 warheads by 2035 and Russia’s continued modernization and aggressive posture.
  - North Korea’s expanding arsenal and potential collaboration with Russia raise additional concerns.

- Iran’s nuclear program has been set back due to U.S. and Israeli actions, offering a rare positive development.
- **U.S. Nuclear Strategy:**
  - Dr. Kroenig advocates maintaining the traditional U.S. counterforce strategy, targeting adversary leadership and military assets rather than cities.
  - The Strategic Posture Commission recommends updating force posture to deter two nuclear peers simultaneously.
- **Strategic and Non-Strategic Forces:**
  - The current cap of 1,550 strategic warheads under New START is deemed insufficient for today’s threat environment.
  - Recommendations include increasing strategic delivery platforms and uploading additional warheads.
  - Non-strategic capabilities like the SLCM-N (nuclear-armed cruise missile) are supported, with calls for additional ground-launched theater nuclear weapons.
- **Missile Defense:**
  - Homeland missile defense should evolve beyond rogue state threats to counter limited attacks from Russia and China.
  - Support for space-based sensors and interceptors aligns with Trump’s “Golden Dome” vision.
- **Arms Control and Nonproliferation:**
  - While nonproliferation remains a bipartisan priority, the future of arms control is uncertain.
  - Dr. Kroenig is skeptical about the viability of new treaties, especially trilateral agreements involving China.
  - Risk reduction measures may replace traditional arms control frameworks.
- **Modernization Challenges:**
  - Delays in Sentinel and Columbia programs are acknowledged, with emphasis on urgency and bipartisan support to overcome obstacles.
  - The role of the NNSA and its capacity to meet future demands was discussed, with suggestions for structural reform.
- **Global Posture and Alliances:**
  - Dr. Kroenig rejects isolationism, affirming U.S. global responsibilities and deterrence commitments to allies.
  - He supports expanding theater nuclear capabilities in Europe and Asia to counter limited-use scenarios.
- **Long-Term Strategy:**
  - Bipartisan consensus is essential for sustaining modernization efforts through changing administrations.
  - The seminar concluded with a call to educate the public on the importance of nuclear deterrence.

## Unabridged Transcript

*(Note: there will invariably be some word errors in the following transcript.)*

00:00:08:11 - 00:00:38:07

Kimberly Cherington

Good morning, everyone. I'm Kimberly Cherington and on behalf of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, or NIDS, I want to welcome you to today's Huessy Seminar: Nuclear Priorities for Trump 2.0. And a special welcome to our featured guest speaker, Dr Matthew Kroenig. I also wanted to let you know that next week, September 26th, we'll be joined by Dr Weaver addressing Theater nuclear forces for the 21st century.

00:00:38:08 - 00:01:05:00

Kimberly Cherington

And we have a whole lineup of speakers for the next 5 or 6 weeks, every Friday. Make sure to go to our [thinkdeterrence.com](https://thinkdeterrence.com) events page to learn more, and to register you and your colleagues for upcoming events. During today's presentation, we encourage you to submit your questions in the chat. On the right hand side or up at the top at the Q&A button.

00:01:05:01 - 00:01:28:01

Kimberly Cherington

And we will address all the questions in the Q&A portion of this talk. Now it's my pleasure to introduce a host for today's seminar, Mr. Peter Huessy, himself, president and Senior Director of Strategic Deterrence Studies at Geo Strategic Analysis and a senior fellow here at NIDS. Peter, over to you.

00:01:28:02 - 00:01:48:10

Peter Huessy

Thank you very much, Kimberly. And I want to say, not only welcome to our speaker, but welcome to our audience, which exceeds about 150 people as of yesterday when they signed up. Particularly, I want to say thank you to our sponsors and also to those of you who have been longtime followers of this series and want to thank you for being here.

00:01:48:12 - 00:02:24:13

Peter Huessy

We are honored today to have Matt Kroenig, who is vice president of the Atlantic Council, but he's also senior director of the Scowcroft Center. He also has a staff of over 30 people. He also handles the fellow's program over at the Atlantic Council. And he was on the commission on the strategic posture. The United States, which issued a report in October 2023, which has garnered a lot of attention because it had somewhere around 80 or so recommendations, many of which have been followed by Congress in the defense bill that they put together.

00:02:24:15 - 00:02:44:02

Peter Huessy

Matt is also a tenured professor at Georgetown University, here in Washington, DC. So, Matt, on behalf of NIDS and our sponsors and friends, want to thank you for taking the time out of your schedule and coming to talk to us, today. So, over to you, sir.

00:02:44:04 - 00:03:09:05

Matt Kroenig

Right. Well, thank you very much. Peter and Kimberly, for the kind of introduction. And, NIDS does great work. So, I'm delighted to be here. And, welcome also to all the distinguished guests, joining us online. And so, I was asked to speak, today about nuclear priorities, for the Trump

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administration. And I think, overall, that, nuclear deterrence will be a priority, for the Trump administration.

00:03:09:05 - 00:03:31:07

Matt Kroenig

And, in general, I think there is a bipartisan consensus on the core pillars of American nuclear strategy. But I think we'll see a little bit more of an emphasis on nuclear deterrence, compared to the previous administration, if people will recall, when the Biden administration came in, they said that their hope was to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.

00:03:31:09 - 00:04:05:03

Matt Kroenig

But I think, there are some indications that the Trump team may see it differently. So, President Trump himself, in his first administration, said that he wanted a nuclear arsenal. That is, quote, top of the pack. And, he has also, been proud of his efforts to modernize nuclear forces since then, referring to it a number of times, if people will remember earlier this year when there was this 8%, what was first reported as a defense spending cut, but then later became clear was really a defense spending shift.

00:04:05:05 - 00:04:30:07

Matt Kroenig

A reprioritization, nuclear deterrence was one of the areas that was ring fenced off, for those, cuts or shifts, depending on how you look at it. And then also Elbridge Colby, who's the undersecretary of defense for policy, has been a longtime advocate for a strong, US nuclear deterrent. So, I think I want to continue with my remarks in six parts.

00:04:30:07 - 00:04:54:07

Matt Kroenig

First, I want to talk about the threat environment. The new Trump team is facing. Second, talk about US nuclear strategy. Third, talk about, us, strategic nuclear forces, fourth non-strategic nuclear forces, fifth missile defense and sixth, arms control and nonproliferation. And I'll, I've been asked to do this in about 30 minutes.

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Matt Kroenig

So, I'll do that and then look forward to Q&A and discussion. So first, when I should say that my remarks are also influenced by my service on the Strategic Posture Commission that, Peter mentioned. And for those who weren't, following our commission, 12-person, bipartisan commission, released our unanimous recommendations to Congress about two years ago.

00:05:21:15 - 00:06:00:07

Matt Kroenig

And so, I think, that may or may reflect a new kind of bipartisan consensus in, US nuclear, forces that I think we saw, picked up at the end of the Biden administration. And I hope we'll see continue in the Trump administration. So first threat environment and this is a dangerous, nuclear threat environment, similar maybe to some of the more dangerous moments of the cold War and, and in some ways even more challenging because, with China's massive nuclear buildup, the United States, for the first time in its history, will need to deter two near peer nuclear powers at the same time.

00:06:00:08 - 00:06:25:08

Matt Kroenig

So, in the past, the United States could focus on Russia, as the primary nuclear competitor, and China and North Korea, others were kind of lesser included cases. But as this, audience may know, China's engaged in the most rapid nuclear buildup since the 1960s, maybe ever, that's projected to have, 1500 nuclear weapons by 2035.

00:06:25:09 - 00:06:45:01

Matt Kroenig

So that would make it a nuclear peer with the United States and Russia. And no guarantee that China stops at this point. And she has said that he wants a first-class military. So, I think he wants a first-class nuclear force as part of that. Why is China engaged in this rapid nuclear buildup?

00:06:45:02 - 00:07:08:05

Matt Kroenig

There are several hypotheses out there, and they all may be true. I think part of it is that she just does want the symbolism of being a nuclear superpower on par with the United States and on Russia. But I also think it's about Taiwan. And I think that, she is learning lessons from Putin's war in Ukraine, seeing that Putin's nuclear threats against the West have worked.

00:07:08:07 - 00:07:27:10

Matt Kroenig

And so as he contemplates an attack on Taiwan, wants to be able to nuke, the United States homeland a lot, not just a little bit, as a way to try to use nuclear threats to deter, American intervention. So China's nuclear buildup is the most significant, part of the threat environment. But it's not the only one.

00:07:27:10 - 00:08:03:03

Matt Kroenig

Russia remains a, nuclear peer competitor is, modernizing its arsenal. Has a huge, non-strategic, nuclear advantage over the United States. Going back to China, I should point out that China, of course, has a theater nuclear advantage over the United States and its allies. Given that the United States and its allies have zero non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in, the Indo-Pacific, whereas China does have this, range of, intermediate and, you know, surface to surface, missiles that are nuclear capable.

00:08:03:04 - 00:08:30:05

Matt Kroenig

But back to, Europe. We've seen Putin making these nuclear threats, so moving, nuclear threats more to the center of Russian strategy. And we see that it's working. And President Biden was very clear that the United States in the West restrained their support to Ukraine because they feared, nuclear escalation. And there is a real risk that nuclear weapons could be used, in the Indo-Pacific or in Europe.

00:08:30:07 - 00:08:55:07

Matt Kroenig

And there was this period in October or so of 2022, where Biden administration officials have,

subsequently said that they estimated at the time that the risk that Putin used nuclear weapons in Europe, was about 5050. So maybe the closest the world's come to nuclear use since the Cuban missile Crisis, or maybe the closest, we've come, ever since, since World War II.

00:08:55:07 - 00:09:24:14

Matt Kroenig

So that's dangerous. These two nuclear superpowers moving nuclear weapons more to the center of their strategy and policy. Then, of course, you have North Korea. North Korea's nuclear arsenal continues to expand and modernize. Reports that North Korea, is building, also theater nuclear weapons, reports that North Korea may now have dozens of nuclear weapons, including ICBMs capable of reaching the United States.

00:09:24:15 - 00:09:51:14

Matt Kroenig

And these dictators are working more closely together. We see that North Korean forces are fighting on the ground in Ukraine. And what is North Korea getting back in return? And there are fears that Russia may be helping North Korea with, its, nuclear and other, strategic capabilities. So this is concerning, I'd say the one, piece of the security environment that's gotten better over the past year is Iran.

00:09:52:00 - 00:10:13:07

Matt Kroenig

At the start of the Trump administration, Iran was, according to some reports, really, days away. Dash time to one bomb's worth of nuclear weapons that had shrunk. Today's, because of the Israeli and the US strikes on Iran's nuclear program. It's been set back, unclear, by how far it's been set back.

00:10:13:09 - 00:10:44:08

Matt Kroenig

But, impossible for Iran to enter the nuclear club, in the near term. Whereas just a few months ago, it was possible that Iran, was on the pathway to becoming the fourth, nuclear power that the United States would need to contend with its nuclear strategy. So, Iran, a piece of good news, but I think with Russia, China and North Korea, a lot for the United States to worry about, what does this mean for nuclear strategy?

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Matt Kroenig

And, after China began this massive nuclear buildup, you had some experts saying, well, this means that the United States needs to throw its old nuclear strategy out the window. Deterring two nuclear superpowers at the same time is going to require a different approach. Maybe this means that the United States should go more to a minimum deterrent and, kind of a counter value nuclear strategy targeting, cities.

00:11:11:12 - 00:11:40:07

Matt Kroenig

The posture commission I served on considered that very carefully, but, concluded that, no, actually, America's traditional nuclear strategy, has worked for 80 years. There's no reason to throw that out. And instead, what we need to do is update it, to deal with two powers. And so that nuclear strategy rests on some key pillars, but one, it's extended nuclear deterrence for the

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United States and its allies.

00:11:40:09 - 00:12:10:00

Matt Kroenig

It's what's, sometimes referred to as counterforce targeting, planning to target, adversary leadership, nuclear forces, military forces or supporting industry. It's not a city busting, strategy. And that counterforce strategy makes sense for a number of reasons, including because our, dictator adversaries don't really care about their populations. So, threatening to kill, innocent Russians, doesn't deter Putin.

00:12:10:00 - 00:12:41:08

Matt Kroenig

He's perfectly happy to kill over a million. Russians and his war, against Ukraine. And so, you need to hold at risk what the adversary cares about. And that's, again, their leadership, their nuclear forces, their military forces and so on. Also, a US nuclear strategy has always tried to tailor the deterrent to the adversary to have flexible nuclear options, including non-strategic, nuclear weapons, to try to control escalation at the lowest levels.

00:12:41:09 - 00:13:04:11

Matt Kroenig

And so, anyway, the commission concluded that all those pillars of American nuclear strategy, still hold and, I agree with that. So instead, we concluded that what needs to change is how, is our forces, either the composition or the number or both, to deal with two nuclear. Pure competitors at the same time.

00:13:04:12 - 00:13:29:12

Matt Kroenig

So, beginning first with strategic forces as, this group may know, the United States currently has 1550, strategic deployed nuclear weapons as an upper limit, according to the new Start treaty. And new start, of course, expires next year. So, I'll come back to arms control in a moment. But when that force level was set of 1550, this was for a very different security environment.

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Matt Kroenig

This is in 2010, when, the thought of a direct conflict between, Russia and China, almost seemed unthinkable. And, and Russia was the only nuclear superpower we didn't have to worry about China. And so, 1550 made sense in 2010, for a very different security environment. Now, in 2025, 1550 is going to be, insufficient, much more dangerous security environment.

00:14:02:10 - 00:14:28:10

Matt Kroenig

And you have China's, buildup. And so, China's buildup means more targets, for America's traditional approach of counter force targeting, America's nuclear force is also potentially more vulnerable. And it's, an extreme scenario, but not impossible that China and Russia could conspire, in a nuclear attack against the United States, which could, make our forces more vulnerable.

00:14:28:11 - 00:14:55:11

Matt Kroenig

So, for these and other reasons, the, commission recommended, that the United States, essentially plan for the first strategic forces buildup since the end of the Cold War and recommended that the United States prepare to buy more. Strategic submarines prepared to buy more strategic bombers, and prepare to upload additional nuclear weapons on existing platforms.

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Matt Kroenig

And from my conversations with, Biden administration officials, some of the things they've written and said publicly, they said that they took that part of the report very seriously and took all the steps that would be needed to upload additional warheads to, ICBMs and SVMs. And so, my understanding is that option is there for the, the Trump team to move out on if they decide to do that, non-strategic nuclear weapons.

00:15:25:11 - 00:15:54:09

Matt Kroenig

So, the United States, had a wider array of, non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, during the Cold War. You know, these are lower yield, weapons that are deployed or deployable in theater. After the end of the Cold War, we eliminated almost all of those capabilities. And the only remaining capability are the B61 gravity bombs in Europe that can be delivered by dual capable fighters.

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Matt Kroenig

And so, our commission concluded that that's insufficient. That the United States needs to, develop and deploy additional non-strategic nuclear weapons, to both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. And that these are capabilities that would need to be survivable, low yield, prompt, capable of penetrating an enemy's, missile defenses. And so one capability that, we hope is coming is the slick, in, so this would be the nuclear armed cruise missile, to go on us, ships or submarines, and Trump one called for this, capability.

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Matt Kroenig

The Biden administration initially, said that they weren't going to continue with this capability. But then it was, restored by bipartisan majorities in Congress that say, no, we need this capability. The heads of several US command, some Indo-Pacific command, Yukon, have said we need this capability. And so that now has become part of the program of record.

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Matt Kroenig

And so, I think that will be continued by the Trump team. I, now I think that's necessary but not sufficient. And I heard Kimberly say that Greg Weaver will be here next week, and Greg Weaver did a nice study for us here at the Atlantic Council about additional theater, nuclear weapons. And I think he makes a good case that some kind of ground, ground launch capability would make a lot of sense in the Indo-Pacific, but especially, in Europe.

00:17:31:07 - 00:18:09:02

Matt Kroenig

So, I would advocate for having also some kind of ground launched, theater, capability. Let's

say more about that in a moment. In addition, my understanding from talking to NATO officials is the idea of updating the B61 gravity bombs, to have a kind of standoff capability. So maybe something like a nuclear Jasssem, is something that European defense officials are much more open to today, than, you know, would have been imaginable, say, ten years ago, in part because they see, Putin's aggression in Ukraine, they see the nuclear threats.

00:18:09:06 - 00:18:31:15

Matt Kroenig

And so they're open to the idea that NATO also needs to update its nuclear capabilities. So, and some have called for, kind of a theater tryout of nuclear weapons. And so we have the SLCM coming, I and Greg Weaver and some others think some kind of ground-based capability would be necessary. And, we have dual capable aircraft, and B61 is in Europe.

00:18:31:15 - 00:18:59:12

Matt Kroenig

And again, the officials apparently think, a standoff capability there could make sense. The downsides to that, though, or the challenges. One is, the defense budget, is that is it going to be enough to fund the program of record plus additional capabilities, tradeoffs between nuclear and conventional? And as I said, bridge Colby has been a proponent of nuclear deterrence.

00:18:59:13 - 00:19:42:14

Matt Kroenig

But as also pointed out, the vital importance of having conventional capabilities that can deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. And so in some areas, there are just tradeoffs, between investments and nuclear and investments in conventional. And so will there be a decision to forego some of these, additional capabilities to, to focus on the, conventional, and then there's just the ability of the Department of Energy and, in NSA, they're already having some challenges, with the program of record, us and, you know, so do they have the ability to take on additional requirements?

00:19:43:00 - 00:20:18:06

Matt Kroenig

So, so given, I would advocate for SLCM-N plus for non-strategic capabilities. But if I were a betting person, I would bet that maybe they just continue with the SLCM-N and don't add capabilities. Such as a nuclear JASSM or nuclear GLCM or IRBM. Missile defense, as this group probably knows, long standing US missile defense policy has been to have theater air and missile defenses and then for homeland missile defense.

00:20:18:06 - 00:20:44:04

Matt Kroenig

The policy was that this would be for rogue states like North Korea and Iran. But not for major powers like Russia and China, and instead will rely on nuclear deterrence, to deal with major powers, like Russia and China. But, our commission said that that needs to change, that we do need to have a homeland missile defense system capable of dealing with threats from Russia and China.

00:20:44:06 - 00:21:08:02

Matt Kroenig

And we made that recommendation for a number of, reasons. First, that the sanctuaries, or the,

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the homeland is unlikely to be a sanctuary in a major war with, say, China. China or Russia could try to attack, the United States. And so why leave ourselves vulnerable, to those kind of attacks as a matter of policy?

00:21:08:03 - 00:21:28:10

Speaker 1

Second, Russia and China are building, Aaron, missile defense systems for us. And so I think the theory was that if we showed restraint, they would show restraint. We would leave ourselves vulnerable. And, this mutual vulnerability would lead to stability. But we see that hasn't worked. We're not getting stability. We're getting aggression from both.

00:21:28:11 - 00:21:51:01

Speaker 1

And again, Russia and China are building air and missile defenses. Now, one of the criticisms against missile defense, historically has been well, stopping a large scale Russian or Chinese attack will just be impossible. And that may be true, but, that doesn't mean that we should leave ourselves open to more limited, attacks.

00:21:51:03 - 00:22:25:04

Speaker 1

You know, I saw a scenario where, China invades Taiwan. The United States comes to Taiwan's defense. The conflict is escalating, and China decides to launch a small number and a small number. Choose your number. I don't know, 612, 24 of conventional or nuclear missiles at the homeland. Again, why leave ourselves, vulnerable to that kind of attack as a matter of policy, having an ability to, defend against and ideally deter those coercive attacks makes a lot of sense.

00:22:25:05 - 00:23:06:02

Speaker 1

And so here I think this is something that the Trump administration has, clearly, embraced President Trump's Golden Dome, policy is a major priority. The Pentagon is moving out on that. And we'll have to see exactly what this looks like. There are a lot of, options. Could be, expanding the, current system of ground based interceptors, could be doing, an under layer of, other types of, missile defenses, hypersonic and, cruise missile defense, probably should be a part of this, given that this is what the Russians and the Chinese are building.

00:23:06:04 - 00:23:28:10

Speaker 1

But then ultimately, as, have recommended for some time to be most effective, moving to space, makes a lot of sense. And so a lot of support for a space based sensor layer. And I also think space based interceptors make a lot of sense. And, according to the reports, this is something the Pentagon is looking at very closely.

00:23:28:11 - 00:24:00:10

Speaker 1

I think the, final topic I wanted to, address is arms control and nonproliferation. Maybe I'll do nonproliferation first, which is, easier. There has been, of course, longstanding bipartisan support for nuclear nonproliferation, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, including U.S. allies. And I think that that will hold, you have had, some voices recently say,

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well, why should we be defending South Korea?

00:24:00:10 - 00:24:24:11

Speaker 1

Maybe they should build their own nuclear weapons and take care of North Korea while we deal with, China. And we've had those voices in the past, in the 1960s, there were, some Americans saying, well, let's let India get nuclear weapons to balance against China. Of course they did get nuclear weapons eventually, but not as a matter of U.S., policy.

00:24:24:12 - 00:24:51:02

Speaker 1

So you have heard this, argument for allowing friendly proliferation in Washington in the past? But in the end, the voices saying, no, these are the world's deadliest weapons. Having them fall into the hands of other countries, even our own friends, is too risky. And my bet is that those voices will win out again. And the United States will continue its policy of working to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, even to friendly countries.

00:24:51:03 - 00:25:29:03

Matt Kroenig

Arms control. A little more complicated. New start expires early next year. This is the last remaining arms control agreement, between the United States and Russia. So, the INF treaty, and many other, treaties have gone by the wayside. So, what is the future of, new start? I think a simple follow on, doesn't make sense, because 1550, the current number, the current cap and new start won't give the United States the ability to build up in the way that it needs to deal with Russia and China.

00:25:29:04 - 00:25:57:00

Matt Kroenig

At the same time. And so, I think a simple extension doesn't make sense. So, are there some other creative frameworks that that could work? Well, let me just back up an overarching point. I think many experts, including the commission that I served on, were pretty skeptical about the future of arms control and think that after a new start, there probably won't be any negotiated constraints.

00:25:57:02 - 00:26:24:05

Matt Kroenig

On nuclear weapons. And when we think about the future of arms control, we'll need to think in other terms. Risk reduction measures. Missile launch notifications, things of that sort, or a binding treaty limiting the number of nuclear weapons among the major powers is, at least for the foreseeable future, a thing of the past. On the other hand, we know that President Trump himself, likes deals, likes arms control.

00:26:24:05 - 00:26:46:05

Matt Kroenig

He, in the 1980s, as a New York businessman, used to say that he could negotiate a better arms control deal with the Soviet Union than the professionals. In his first term, tried really hard. And Marshall S. Billingslea, his arms control negotiator, was trying really hard to get Russia and Chinese trilateral arms control talks going.

00:26:46:07 - 00:27:13:07

Matt Kroenig

Of course, those didn't really go anywhere because the Chinese were unwilling to engage. Seriously. The Biden administration also tried to get talks with Russia and China going. That didn't really go anywhere. But Trump has, expressed interest, since he's been in office. In some kind of new arms control. I've heard from some of his officials that they're interested in some kind of post new start arms control, because that's, in the boss.

00:27:13:07 - 00:27:40:04

Matt Kroenig

The boss is interested. So. So it will something like this be possible, you know, so I see two possibilities, but I think they're unlikely. So, one possibility would be, that you get some kind of trilateral agreement, with the United States, Russia and China. And there are some frameworks that could work. And we did a paper on this at the Scowcroft Center several years ago.

00:27:40:05 - 00:28:10:01

Matt Kroenig

But I just think it's going to be, essentially impossible to get China to negotiate in good faith and beyond that, to agree to, verifiable limits on their nuclear forces. You know, they have plans to build up. They're not planning to, to stop. So, I think trilateral is going to be difficult. The other possibility I've heard is, could you get some kind of follow on new Start treaty just with Russia, but at some higher level of limits?

00:28:10:02 - 00:28:33:15

Matt Kroenig

And then going back to, say, the Moscow treaty limits or something like that. And so, it'd be high enough that the United States felt comfortable that it could, build up within that, new, constraint in a way that would allow it to deter China and Russia at the same time. So, so maybe there's something there that may be more, feasible than bringing in, China.

00:28:34:00 - 00:28:52:03

Matt Kroenig

But I still think there are a lot of difficulties there. You know, could you get something like that by the Senate? You know, would, majority of senators agree to an arms control agreement that leaves China unconstrained? You know, personally, I think that's a bad idea. I think a lot of senators might think that's a bad idea.

00:28:52:04 - 00:29:19:00

Matt Kroenig

And then, you know, can we get Putin to negotiate in good faith and to comply with those limits? He's not negotiating in good faith over Ukraine. He's cheated on almost every other arms control agreement and is not in full compliance, currently with, new start. So, my best guess is, like with our Ukraine negotiations, these arms control negotiations, if they get off the ground, are going to confront those hard realities.

00:29:19:01 - 00:29:56:08

Matt Kroenig

And, we will see an end to negotiated arms control between Washington and Moscow for the first time since the 1970s. And, arms control again, we'll have to focus more on risk reduction

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measures and other things. And in those areas, so just to wrap up, I do think we're entering a more dangerous nuclear security environment, mainly because of China's, massive nuclear buildup, and, and increasing Russian nuclear threats, that the United States doesn't need to fundamentally reform its nuclear strategy that works.

00:29:56:08 - 00:30:21:07

Matt Kroenig

We do need to change is our posture. I think that will require uploading more warheads in the near term and planning to buy more strategic delivery platforms over the long term. I think it does require new non-strategic nuclear weapons slick. And then at a minimum ideally more. Although there are constraints. Homeland missile defense I'm pleased to see where we're going with Golden Dome.

00:30:21:08 - 00:30:39:06

Matt Kroenig

I think we'll stick with our traditional nonproliferation policy, and the future of arms control looks bleak. But overall, I think, nuclear weapons will be more of a priority for the Trump administration than it was for the Biden administration. And I hope President Trump is right and we get our nuclear arsenal at the top of the pack.

00:30:39:06 - 00:30:43:09

Matt Kroenig

So, all in there and, look forward to Q&A and discussion.

00:30:43:10 - 00:31:01:03

Peter Huessy

Thank you very much, Matt. I'm going to go just through the questions and put some in the chat function. People out there just go to the chat function. We have a number of questions. Number one I'm going to read I'm going to do two questions here pretty soon. What purpose in China's mind does their nuclear build up serve?

00:31:01:03 - 00:31:12:11

Peter Huessy

Number one. And number two related is do China and Russia think of nuclear deterrence in the same manner as the United States?

00:31:12:13 - 00:31:34:13

Matt Kroenig

Yeah. Good. Question. Peter. So, why is China engaging in this, massive nuclear buildup? And, I think there are four hypotheses. And, they all may be right. Or maybe some combination may be right. One the one I'm most skeptical of. You do hear some in the arms control community say essentially, oh, poor China.

00:31:34:14 - 00:31:58:11

Matt Kroenig

You know, they're threatened by us. And developments in our posture, including missile defense, makes them fear that their nuclear weapons are vulnerable. And so, they're just engaging in a build up to make sure that their nuclear forces remain survivable, that they continue to have a second-strike capability. I, I'm skeptical of that, but that's an argument.

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00:31:58:12 - 00:32:27:14

Matt Kroenig

You hear, the arguments that I think have more plausibility, one is, is that this is more symbolism. For Xi he says he wants China to be a world class, power, that he wants China to have a first-class military. He looks around and sees that the other major powers have more nuclear weapons than him, and he, told his military, you know, I want as many nuclear weapons as as the United States.

00:32:27:15 - 00:32:54:07

Matt Kroenig

So that's possible. The other one is the one I mentioned in the talk that, is that this is about Taiwan, and that, they want to be able to, have the option to attack Taiwan, that they're worried about, US military intervention, and that they're worried that the United States could use, nuclear deterrence, as a way to stop their ability to take Taiwan.

00:32:54:08 - 00:33:18:11

Matt Kroenig

And, looking at, Putin and Ukraine, he sees that these nuclear threats work. So, if Biden was unwilling to help, Ukraine as much as he could have because he was afraid of nuclear escalation, maybe by engaging in this massive nuclear buildup and at the time of crisis or war, making explicit nuclear threats, can he get the United States to stay out of, Taiwan so he can achieve his objectives?

00:33:18:13 - 00:33:41:10

Matt Kroenig

Now, the final one is, the fourth one is, is this a shift in China's, nuclear strategy? You know, for a long time, we thought that they had a kind of a minimum deterrent strategy and, essentially a counter value targeting strategy that they'd aim at cities and kill a lot of people. But, as I mentioned, the United States has had more of a counterforce strategy.

00:33:41:10 - 00:34:10:12

Matt Kroenig

Russia has always had more of a counterforce, strategy. And so is China. Also, re, formulating its nuclear strategy and thinking, okay, we want to also have the ability to have larger numbers of forces, more accurate forces, a launch under, warning, doctrine that could allow us to engage in, you know, strikes against more strategic targets, in the United States and in Russia.

00:34:10:13 - 00:34:38:14

Matt Kroenig

So, I think those are the four hypotheses. I don't think anybody except Xi, or anybody outside of China knows for sure. There may be some use to all of them, in terms of, do China and Russia see their nuclear weapons differently than us? Your second question, I think the answer is yes. And I think the, the main differences, you know, they just have a very different orientation to the current international system.

00:34:38:14 - 00:35:00:10

Matt Kroenig

This is the system that the United States and its allies built. We've always used our nuclear

weapons to deter the free world, maintain the status quo. But, Russia, China, North Korea are revisionist powers, and they explicitly say that Putin says he wants to revise the security architecture in Europe and wants to restore the Russian Empire.

00:35:00:12 - 00:35:20:10

Matt Kroenig

He said he wants new rules or no rules. She's very clearly a revisionist power. He's not happy with where things are with Taiwan right now. He wants Taiwan to be part of China. He said he's willing to use force to do that. So, the United States uses his nuclear weapons in a defensive way, in a deterrent way to maintain the existing order.

00:35:20:11 - 00:35:35:00

Matt Kroenig

Russia and China want to use nuclear weapons as a backstop for aggression. They want to be able to engage in aggression against their neighbors, under the protection of a nuclear shield. So, I think they are fundamentally different in that way.

00:35:35:01 - 00:35:53:06

Peter Huessy

Okay. Another question Matt came up with. Should the United States specifically. Change our nuclear posture to deal with the developments in India, both their missiles and their nuclear forces?

00:35:53:07 - 00:36:24:09

Matt Kroenig

I think the answer to that is no. And, you know, traditionally in U.S nuclear strategy, we've thought a lot about the adversaries we're trying to deter, of course. And so today in that category, I'd put, China, Russia, North Korea, and these are U.S. adversaries, nuclear armed. We've also thought a lot about our formal treaty allies, extending nuclear deterrence to NATO, to Japan, to South Korea, maybe to others.

00:36:24:10 - 00:36:42:07

Matt Kroenig

And I think that approach still makes sense. There are other nuclear powers like India and Pakistan. But they don't fit into either of those categories. We don't have a formal alliance with either India or Pakistan, so we don't have to spend a lot of time thinking about how do we extend, deterrence to them?

00:36:42:08 - 00:37:01:06

Matt Kroenig

And they're not adversaries. It's hard for me. I mean, maybe you're more creative than I am, Peter, but it's hard for me to spin a scenario where we're in a war against India or in a war against, Pakistan. And so, for that reason, we also don't need to think about deterring them from using nuclear weapons against us, our allies.

00:37:01:07 - 00:37:25:14

Matt Kroenig

So maybe that'll change in the future. But I think for now, India and Pakistan don't need to feature largely in American nuclear deterrence strategy. I think they still should be a something

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the State Department thinks about, you know, trying to help them negotiate risk reduction measures, maybe, arms control agreements, among themselves, but not a nuclear deterrence strategy.

00:37:25:15 - 00:37:28:11

Matt Kroenig  
Priority for the United States.

00:37:28:12 - 00:37:54:12

Peter Huessy  
Okay. One of our questions came up with you. As you know, there has been slippage in both the Sentinel and Columbia with respect to the original IOCs. I'm just finished writing that paper on what Sentinel has done, and I think they're very much now on the right track, particularly after having that exam examined everything kind of all over again because of the McCurdy breach.

00:37:54:14 - 00:38:02:07

Peter Huessy  
Are you? What would you further recommend the administration do to get both Sentinel Columbia

00:38:02:07 - 00:38:09:03

Peter Huessy  
back on track, which both services the Navy and Air Force have said that's their highest priority.

00:38:09:04 - 00:38:27:10

Matt Kroenig  
Yeah, I guess I'd make a couple of comments. One, you know, we need these capabilities. And, some have used these delays to say, oh, well, maybe we, you know, we don't need a ground-based system at all. This is too difficult. I think that's not the right conclusion to draw. These are essential capabilities for us.

00:38:27:10 - 00:38:52:05

Matt Kroenig  
Nuclear deterrence. And every administration for decades have thought that ICBMs are an important pillar of American nuclear strategy. And, you know, one thing that's, notable is, while in the United States, some debate whether we can get rid of ICBMs, if you look at the adversaries, Russia and China Sea ICBMs as the pillar, of their deterrent, you know, with China's buildup, what are they building?

00:38:52:05 - 00:39:17:15

Matt Kroenig  
They're building a lot of ground based, silos. And so, we need all three legs. So, so that's one take away. Two. You know, part of the delay is, was kind of, well, not the, maybe unforeseen, but not the fault of those, doing it. And so, with the ICBMs, as you know, Peter, there was an original plan.

00:39:17:15 - 00:39:36:00

Matt Kroenig

And then when they started doing it, they realized, oh, we need to redo a lot of the wiring and other things that's going to be more difficult. And so this is going to take more time and cost more money. And then third, what to do to get it back on track. You know, I'm, I'm more of a, I'm, I'm a professor, as you pointed out.

00:39:36:00 - 00:39:58:14

Matt Kroenig

I'm more of a worthless, strategy and policy guy when it comes to how do you build stuff? Not my area of expertise. I'm there. Probably others on the call who have better insights. I think making this a priority. I guess one of the things we can do, and this is what we said in the commission report, we use, where it's urgent and urgency, I think, dozens of times.

00:39:58:14 - 00:40:22:04

Matt Kroenig

And so just to understand that lawmakers understand how important and urgent this is, people like us and, importantly, the lawmakers need to make the case to the American people. How urgent and important this is. And I think if that's understood, then, some of these obstacles, you know, is there enough money, etc. can be cleared.

00:40:22:05 - 00:40:29:13

Matt Kroenig

But, again, not, I'm, more of a strategist and, not as good on, on how do you build things?

00:40:29:15 - 00:40:46:06

Peter Huessy

Would you recommend that we build something like this crashing or click them in some of our allies, but would be short range or medium range, ballistic missiles based on land.

00:40:46:08 - 00:40:50:10

Matt Kroenig

Yeah. So I think that would make a lot of sense. For.

00:40:50:10 - 00:40:53:08

Peter Huessy

It scared the heck out of the Russians when it.

00:40:53:09 - 00:41:13:07

Matt Kroenig

Yeah, the Russians and the Chinese wouldn't like it. And so that's one reason why, it's probably the right thing to do. But then the other thing is, you know, just looking at NATO and I'm at the Atlantic Council, we were founded in 1961 to support the NATO alliance. We're global now, but we interact with European allies almost every day.

00:41:13:09 - 00:41:36:02

Matt Kroenig

And so, I do worry about the future of NATO's nuclear deterrent because, you know, we've always or for decades have thought it was important for NATO as an alliance to have a nuclear capability. So, we have allies, several allies with dual capable aircraft. We have American B61 gravity bombs forward deployed, to Europe.

00:41:36:04 - 00:41:57:13

Matt Kroenig

But, you know, how does it how do those capabilities work? In a war against Russia on the eastern flank, if Russia were to use nuclear weapons, and say, Poland, you know, the real challenges with those, B61 gravity bombs. How long does it take that they're not to get them ready to go?

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Matt Kroenig

They're not very prompt. And then are we really going to fly, airplanes, you know, kind of directly into the into Russian air and missile defenses? I'm over the target. They'd be very vulnerable. And so, I think having something that would be more prompt, like a ground launched missile would be more prompt. And I, you know, if it's a cruise missile, or an erbiu I think would be better able to penetrate air and missile defenses than a than an airplane.

00:42:29:07 - 00:42:54:00

Matt Kroenig

And, so, and then I think also it just shows, seriousness, you know, putting our money where our mouth is, we're not just saying we're going to deter, Putin from using, nuclear weapons in Europe. We're building capabilities to do that. And I would point out and maybe I should have said this in the threat environment section, I think the threat we face now is different than in the Cold War and the Cold War.

00:42:54:00 - 00:43:29:11

Matt Kroenig

There was a fear of, kind of massive bolt out of the blue, full scale, including nuclear attack. I think now the greatest danger is the conventional conflict that escalates to the limited use of nuclear weapons. And so how can we best deter limited nuclear use? And so, I think the triad and the strategic forces are the backstop, but also having lower yield, theater based, weapons to show that if, you know, Putin uses one or 2 or 12 nuclear weapons, we have options between doing nothing and thermonuclear war.

00:43:29:14 - 00:43:39:06

Matt Kroenig

We can retaliate with a limited strike of our own. And so, I think ground based, weapons in Europe and Asia would make sense for that reason.

00:43:39:07 - 00:44:12:13

Peter Huessy

I've gotten a lot of, inquiries from fellow think tank people and press that the United States national security strategy is going to pull back our forces from around the world and concentrate on what they call hemispheric protection, which is here. I know the strategy is not out. It's supposedly on the Secretary defense's desk. What's your sense as to I know you're guessing here, but my answer has been, no, we're not going to retreat from the world.

00:44:12:14 - 00:44:33:11

Peter Huessy

But we're not going to get into these what if called endless wars or wars that come out very

badly for the United States, who are very, it's like a draw as opposed to winning, over. Those of you out there should know that Matt did write a book called, *We Win, They Lose*, which was a good idea.

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Peter Huessy

So over to Matt on that.

00:44:36:14 - 00:44:53:05

Matt Kroenig

Yeah, well, well, first, a lot of ways I could take this, but maybe the. I think the most important data point is how does President Trump, himself see the world? And I think he's been pretty clear that he has this peace through strength, philosophy. And so, I think there are a number of components to that.

00:44:53:05 - 00:45:19:11

Matt Kroenig

I think one is, is peace. And as you point out, he is skeptical of these strong, long, drawn out nation building campaigns. He was skeptical of Afghanistan. And I think he's skeptical of Ukraine. You know, where is this going? What's the point? But it's, peace through strength. And so I think he does want the United States to have a strong military, a top of the pack nuclear force, for deterrence.

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Matt Kroenig

And so, I do think he thinks deterrence is important. And if you just look at his foreign policy in the first term and even in the past, eight or so months, you know, he's not just focusing on the Western Hemisphere. He's used military force against Iran in June. He's spending a lot of time with focus on Europe.

00:45:41:00 - 00:46:02:07

Matt Kroenig

Got the Europeans to agree to a 5% spending pledge at NATO. And is spending a lot of time on negotiating peace, in Ukraine. So, I think we see that that Trump is not isolationist. He thinks the United States has worldwide responsibilities. And one other data point, it was reported that the Pentagon was going to cut off, aid to Ukraine.

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Matt Kroenig

At some point, Trump overturned that. So, there may be some in his administration who think we're only going to do the Western Hemisphere, but I don't think that's how Trump views it. So even if for the, India's, well, so to the ends, we'll have to wait and see. You know, almost every US National Security and National Defense Strategy says protecting the homeland is the first and most important priority for any American president.

00:46:29:15 - 00:46:50:15

Matt Kroenig

And I think that's right. And so, we'll have to see. Is it, you know, Western homeland and Western Hemisphere first, but China, Europe, Middle East, etc. are still important. I'd be okay

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with that. You know, if it says Western Hemisphere only, I think that's a problem. I doubt it'll say that. And even if it does, I don't think that Trump will, be constrained by that.

00:46:50:15 - 00:46:56:11

Matt Kroenig

I think we see that he believes the United States still has global responsibilities.

00:46:56:12 - 00:47:28:07

Peter Huessy

Do you see any downside to the agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia? I mean, they just said it was a defense agreement. But the assumption is that it has something to do with nuclear weapons. If Iran goes bad and the Saudis say, oops, is that where they're going? I don't know, to be honest with you. I've, I was told in graduate school, do not study the Middle East because nobody understands it.

00:47:28:08 - 00:47:57:00

Matt Kroenig

Yeah, well, the recent headlines, you know, they're pretty recent. So, I haven't had time to, to really dig into it, but, you know, my first book was on nuclear technology transfer. And why do countries cooperate on nuclear weapons? And this this has been one of the longstanding, you know, fears and rumors, Saudi Arabia, was involved in, financing Pakistan's, nuclear development in the 1980s.

00:47:57:02 - 00:48:20:07

Matt Kroenig

And so, there were always fears, is there a quid pro quo that Pakistan said, okay, when, you know, when you need them, we'll help you build nuclear weapons. So that is something that experts have worried about. For decades. And I, I just haven't followed the latest. I think if it's in response to Iran, the fact that their program's been set back, is, good news in that regard.

00:48:20:09 - 00:48:41:15

Matt Kroenig

And I guess one other, point, you know, yeah, I do think that the United States has played an important role and, stabilizing, the middle East and, working with traditional Gulf partners like Saudi Arabia. And I feel more comfortable with the United States playing that role than Pakistan. So, I guess that gives me a little bit of pause for that reason as well.

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Matt Kroenig

I wish it were the United States and Saudi Arabia cooperating more closely on security and not Pakistan.

00:48:48:14 - 00:49:17:07

Peter Huessy

Would like to ask you a question. It's an open question. And that is it's often not talked about, but it is critical to our return. And that's in in this way, they now have new leadership. And I think going back to particularly to Madelyn Creedon and General Klotz, I think those two were critical to moving us in the right direction, but I'm just going to lay it out on where are they, what are the challenges there?

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Peter Huessy

Map and what do we need to do that maybe we're not doing?

00:49:23:04 - 00:49:42:07

Matt Kroenig

Yeah. And I think this goes back a little bit to the question of the delays in the platforms. I'm more of a strategist and less of a, how do you, you know, do the science and do the engineering? I agree there's a problem with, in an essay, and,

00:49:42:08 - 00:50:09:12

Matt Kroenig

Yeah, it needs to be fixed that there have been some big proposals over the years. Maybe it should be moved out of the Department of Energy. Maybe it should be moved to the Department of Defense. You know, that's not something that we recommended in our posture commission, so I'm, sorry to, kind of punt on this, but I think Madelyn or at least Gordon Haggerty or others with more time under their belt at NNSA would be better positioned to answer that question.

00:50:09:13 - 00:50:29:11

Peter Huessy

No, I agree with you. It's a very tough issue. Some people have suggested that we freeze nuclear weapons stockpiles where they are with Russia and the United States, and maybe try to include China, which I doubt they do that. But is the idea of a freeze even a good idea?

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Matt Kroenig

I would say no. And, you know, going back to what I was saying, before 1550, the current level that the United States has was set in 2010. And that's a very different world. We're, already in a new world, and we see where China's going with a much bigger, arsenal. And so, the United States is going to need more than 15, 50.

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Matt Kroenig

You know, what is the exact number? I think only planners at Stratcom can figure that out as they, you know, figure out what are the targets and how many warheads do they need to hold those at risk? But it's going to be more than it was in 2010. I've heard people guesstimate, you know, maybe it's, 2350 or something like that.

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Matt Kroenig

Back to kind of, you know, Washington treaty numbers. So, freezing at the current level is bad for the United States. We need more and, kind of an important point, thinking about, force requirements and arms control. You know, force requirements need to come first. That's the most important thing. What do we need to deter nuclear war?

00:51:37:01 - 00:51:57:14

Matt Kroenig

And start there. And then if there's excess, then you can talk about arms control and negotiating that away. But you don't do the reverse. You don't say, what kind of arms control agreements can we negotiate? Therefore, here are the nuclear weapons we have left over to deter. You know, that's putting it backwards. You need to first and foremost deter nuclear war.

00:51:57:15 - 00:52:12:03

Matt Kroenig

And, and so first we need to set our requirements. What do we need to deter Russia and China and then see what's left over. But I think we're going to find we don't have enough. Not that we have anything left over to freeze or trade away.

00:52:12:04 - 00:52:45:05

Peter Huessy

One thing I'm going to turn it over to, Jim Petrosky, who's our president, and see if Jim has a question. He'd like to run by you. Jim. Over to you, sir.

James Petrosky

Yeah. Okay. Thank you. Yes, Matt, I, you've really covered the whole breadth of everything, nuclear as we move forward. I just I'd like to get your impression, do your final impression here because you haven't talked far into the future, and we're looking at a modernization that's going to hit, you know, well out into 2060s.

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James Petrosky

And I'm curious as to your thoughts as to what can be done now to position ourselves for severe success as we move forward, because every administration and you've been through many of these, every administration has a different priority, a different move. How do we set ourselves up for success in that long term view? And so, that was what I want to hear from you.

00:53:07:12 - 00:53:28:13

Matt Kroenig

Well, thank thanks, James. And I do think, nonpartisanship and bipartisanship is important in this space. And it's hard sometimes. But, but none of this is going to be done within four years or eight years. And I see, yeah. Bob Peters from my friend to heritage has some good points on in this regard.

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Matt Kroenig

You know, in the chat here, what's really going to get done by 2028. And so, I think it is important then to build the bipartisan consensus of what needs to be done so that it can stay on track, administration, after administration. And so, I think there are examples in the past. I'm, I'm at the Scowcroft Center.

00:53:49:08 - 00:54:10:02

Matt Kroenig

Scowcroft was the chair of the Scowcroft Commission in 1983. That laid out an approach that was, I think, essentially strong nuclear forces, but also strong arms control. And I still think that's essentially a recipe that they can still work, that, you know, even though the future of arms control is bleak, we're going to keep trying.

00:54:10:02 - 00:54:27:02

Matt Kroenig

And I hope that that can get our friends on the, you know, left wing of the Democratic Party on board. But that we also need to deter. And so, here's what we need to do. There. And so, I think efforts like this, efforts like the Strategic Posture Commission to make sure that, we can maintain a bipartisan consensus is, is probably the single most important thing we can do.

00:54:33:04 - 00:54:49:15

James Petrosky

Respecting your time and our audience's time, I want to turn it over to Kimberly to close this out. Thank you so much for this. And thank you to our audience. And we're picking up numbers. Go tell your friends, family cohorts about this, because the world needs to know, not just the deterrence community.

00:54:49:15 - 00:54:53:06

James Petrosky

Everyone needs to know how important this is. Kimberly, up to you.

00:54:53:08 - 00:55:26:08

Kimberly Cherington

Well, thank you very much. A special thank you to Dr Matthew Koenig for helping us bring these and top topics to a broader audience today. And for all of you that wrote great questions in the chat, I will make sure to send those to Dr. Kroenig if he has time. We're able to answer them in the future. If you're new to NIDS, we wanted to let you know that we are a 501 C3 nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing peace and promoting stability through a strong national security and nuclear deterrent.

00:55:26:10 - 00:56:03:13

Kimberly Cherington

We do this by offering a wide range of deterrence education, from live and virtual events like this one, these two seminars to podcast publications and workshops. Looking ahead, I want everyone to mark their calendars for upcoming Huessy events. We mentioned Greg Weaver next Friday and then October 3<sup>rd</sup>, we have European perspectives on China and the nuclear build up by doctor Max Howell on October 10th, we just added a, new event with David Hoagland from NNSA

00:56:03:13 - 00:56:27:13

Kimberly Cherington

He's the acting deputy administrator for defense programs, so you won't want to miss that one. And October 17th, we have Olli Heinonen and Sarah Burkhard on Iran's nuclear crossroads. You can register for all of the events at our website at Thinkdeterrence.com. And we thank everyone for coming today. We hope you have a peaceful day.

00:56:27:14 - 00:56:55:10

Peter Huessy

Yeah. I just would like to mention General Connor, who handles the Sentinel program for US Air Force Global Strike Command is going to be our speaker. I believe in the first week of December. So, Matt, on behalf of NIDS and myself, it's always, an honor to have you come

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speak to us. We learn a lot and Kimberly will probably have your transcript in video, fairly soon.

00:56:55:11 - 00:57:11:02

Peter Huessy

Oh, she's very quick at this, and we'll send that to you at my best to everybody at the Atlantic Council. You guys do great work, and we find it extraordinarily useful. And again, thank you for spending an hour with us today.

00:57:11:03 - 00:57:18:02

Matt Kroenig

Thank you. It is my pleasure. And always happy to engage with, you and the team, Peter. And, thanks, James and Kimberly as well.