

**National Institute for Deterrence Studies & Peter Huessy Seminar**

***After Iran: What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require? With Henry Sokolski***

7/18/2025 at 10:00-11:00 AM (Eastern)

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**Webinar Transcript**

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**Abstract**

**Title:** *After Iran: What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require?*

**Host:** Peter Huessy, National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)

**Featured Speaker:** Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)

In this timely seminar, Henry Sokolski explores the evolving landscape of nuclear nonproliferation in the wake of recent military actions against Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Drawing on decades of experience in defense policy and nonproliferation strategy, Sokolski revisits foundational frameworks—such as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report—and examines how historical enforcement gaps continue to shape today’s proliferation risks.

The presentation challenges the adequacy of current international safeguards and proposes a bold rethink of enforcement mechanisms, including the potential establishment of a dedicated STRATCOM Nonproliferation Enforcement Command. Sokolski also addresses the legal ambiguities surrounding enrichment rights, the role of the IAEA, and the implications of nuclear sharing and advanced reactor exports.

This seminar offers a provocative and essential discussion for policymakers, analysts, and scholars concerned with the future of global nuclear stability.

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**Executive Summary**

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**Seminar Title:** *After Iran: What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require?*

**Host:** Peter Huessy, National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)

**Speaker:** Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC)

This seminar, hosted by the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, featured a comprehensive and provocative presentation by Henry Sokolski on the future of nuclear nonproliferation enforcement in the wake of recent military actions against Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

Sokolski argued that the current global nonproliferation regime suffers from a lack of both clearly defined rules and credible enforcement mechanisms. Drawing on historical precedents—from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report to the evolution of IAEA safeguards—he emphasized the need for a dual approach: establishing enforceable red lines and ensuring those lines are backed by meaningful consequences.

Key themes included:

- The inadequacy of current IAEA thresholds for detecting nuclear weapons development.
- The legal ambiguity surrounding enrichment rights under the NPT.
- The risks of exporting sensitive nuclear technologies, including advanced reactors and high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU).
- The strategic implications of nuclear sharing and the potential for proliferation among both adversaries and allies.
- A proposal to establish a dedicated STRATCOM Nonproliferation Enforcement Command to institutionalize military support for nonproliferation policy.

Sokolski concluded by urging policymakers to confront uncomfortable questions about enforcement, transparency, and the future of deterrence. He stressed that while not all problems can be solved immediately, failing to discuss them openly is no longer acceptable.

This seminar offered a timely and essential contribution to the ongoing debate about how to adapt nonproliferation policy to a rapidly evolving global security environment.

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## Unabridged Transcript

*(Note: there will invariably be some word errors in the following transcript.)*

00;00;07;26 - 00;00;38;21

Kimberly Cherington

Good morning. I'm Kimberly Cherington on behalf of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, or NIDS. I want to warmly welcome you to today's Huessy Seminar. And a special welcome to today's featured guest, Henry Sokolski. During today's presentation, we encourage you to submit your questions in the chat at any time and stick around to the end of the event to get insights on some of our upcoming Huessy Seminars throughout the summer, and even into the fall.

00;00;38;23 - 00;01;08;16

Kimberly Cherington

You can also go on our website at [Thinkdeterrence.com](https://Thinkdeterrence.com) under events to register for any of our events, or e-mail us at [NIDS@thinkdeterrence.com](mailto:NIDS@thinkdeterrence.com) to get your colleagues on the list as well.

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Now it's my pleasure to introduce our host for today's Huessy Seminar, Mr. Peter Hussey, himself President and Senior director of Strategic Deterrence Studies at Geo Strategic Analysis and senior fellow here at NIDS.

00;01;08;19 - 00;01;13;00

Kimberly Cherington

Welcome. And onto you, Peter.

00;01;13;03 - 00;01;39;15

Peter Huessy

Thank you, Kimberly, very much. I want to welcome our president, Jim Petrosky, who is joining us here from Ohio, and our special guest, Henry Sokolski, who's going to talk about rules for nonproliferation. Henry is the founder and executive director of the nuclear, the Nonproliferation Educational Center, otherwise known as NPEC. He's also teaches at the Institute of World Politics.

00;01;39;18 - 00;02;14;26

Peter Huessy

He's also a senior fellow at the University of California at San Diego, at their School of Global Policy and Strategy. Between 1989 and 1993, Henry was deputy in the department in the office of the Secretary of Defense for nonproliferation. He also worked for the wonderful organization known as Net Assessment. And between 1984 and 1988, which is when I think I first met Henry, he worked for Senator Dan Quayle, a member of the Armed Services Committee, and before that, Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire helped him between 1982 and 83 on nuclear energy issues.

00;02;14;28 - 00;02;24;07

Peter Huessy

Henry, welcome to, thank you very much for joining us. I appreciate you taking the time to come talk to us and over to you, sir.

00;02;24;09 - 00;03;08;03

Henry Sokolski

Okay. The title of today's presentation is, what Policing Nonproliferation might require. Let's see if we can get that first title page up. And the reason it's worth revisiting this question, is we've been by here at various times since the advent of nuclear energy. That would be 1945, and there were some pretty strong views laid out, in a document called the Acheson Lilienthal Report in 1946.

00;03;08;05 - 00;03;35;20

Henry Sokolski

And we've had various iterations, of what it is the rules ought to be and how we should enforce them. Now we kind of go in spurts. And if I was to describe a somewhat similar moment in history as I think we're experiencing now, I would say it would be the late 70s and early 80s, actually, when I first came to Washington.

00;03;35;22 - 00;04;01;00

Henry Sokolski

And at that time, we were worried about Iraq. We were worried a little bit about Iran. We were

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worried about Pakistan. We were worried about India because if it had not supposedly, weaponized and only done a peaceful nuclear explosion, and we, you know, if you have questions about that, we talked about later. We were worried about Argentina.

00;04;01;02 - 00;04;32;28

Henry Sokolski

We were worried about Brazil. And, you know, Libya, there were a lot of, countries that could go nuclear. And also, during this period we were worried about Taiwan, and South Korea, which were allies, I think was any bad luck at all. We may be entering a period not dissimilar, where we're going to have to worry about not just adversaries, but allies.

00;04;33;00 - 00;05;13;04

Henry Sokolski

Also, we backed into tightening the rules as a result of explosive events. In 74, the Indians test exploded their peaceful nuclear device with a lot of American help and material. I might add, which caused a tightening of the rules, at least with regard to what we would export. And then, of course, there was the bombing of the... facilities a variety of times, which ultimately resulted in a somewhat tightening of the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection procedures, as well.

00;05;13;06 - 00;05;48;10

Henry Sokolski

We just bombed something. It's pretty big event. This could be a moment, where we might want to rethink what policing, nonproliferation, might require again. Now, the short answer as to what's required is pretty easy. You need sound rules. Not just rules, but sound rules or red lines and need credible enforcement. I suppose the other idea that I'll try to convey to you is one without the other doesn't really amount to anything.

00;05;48;12 - 00;06;16;25

Henry Sokolski

In other words, just bombing stuff could be exciting, but ultimately won't work very well. If people don't know why you're doing what you're doing and having very clear red lines but not enforcing them doesn't amount to much either. Most of the history, if there is a history of nonproliferation, and I think there is, I've written one, consists of emphasizing one or the other, but not enough both.

00;06;16;27 - 00;06;44;29

Henry Sokolski

Occasionally both. And so, let's see what it might be if we did both. All right. You go to the next slide. Now. Well, I don't know how many of you are old enough to remember, the Outback Steakhouse. They say no rules. Just. Right. Well, no rules, no policing. Not right. It is where we're headed with this section.

00;06;45;01 - 00;07;19;11

Henry Sokolski

Let's go to the next slide. All right. Now, I'm friendly with Matt. Foreign. I mean, we're not very close, but I did, I believe, commissioned him to do work even before he got his doctorate. So, we have a little bit of history. And he wrote this piece, right after our bombing of Iran, in which he said, you know, Trump should warn that any country that attempts to build an illegal nuclear

program is suffering the same fate as Iran.

00;07;19;14 - 00;07;48;28

Henry Sokolski

And he calls this the Trump doctrine on nuclear nonproliferation. Now, I hesitate to say that his formulation is what drove whatever we did. And but it's not as though Matt's formulation, hasn't been repeated by other people who write in places like the Wall Street Journal, etc. Now, as soon as I saw this, I said, well, this is exciting.

00;07;49;00 - 00;08;18;12

Henry Sokolski

I wrote him a note. Okay. What's the legal? Well, he didn't, he didn't, spelled that out. Actually, he kind of skirted that. And I think it's an important question. Now, when I talked with others, they suggested, Oh, well, if there's any new, nuclear fuel making, which brings you to the brink of making nuclear weapons enrichment of uranium or recycling of plutonium or reprocessing.

00;08;18;12 - 00;08;55;12

Henry Sokolski

I said, this is frequently called, well, that would be cause for something to be illegal. In fact, even math suggested that he thought that might make sense. Well, okay, that's a possibility. But you can tell it. You might want to, you know, before you, fire, you might not only want to aim, but get ready for what it is that you think you might have to shoot at, and you might even want to share what that is with the rest of the world, so that maybe you don't shoot as many things.

00;08;55;13 - 00;09;11;17

Henry Sokolski

I mean, this is a form for deterrence. So. Well, here's another example of where maybe you could deter. Next slide.

00;09;11;20 - 00;09;36;08

Speaker 1

Okay. Well, we did get some hints. I mean I know after you do something people ask you why. And what's the next step. And so, the president was asked, you know, what he would he bomb again. If there was, enriching to a concerning level, he said absolutely. Well, it raises the question, what's a concerning level?

00;09;36;08 - 00;10;02;25

Henry Sokolski

But, you know, it's a start. Well, later, more formally, he says, they must open themselves to inspection to verify it doesn't restart its program. Well, you know, what is the program would be the next question. Is it anything that's nuclear. Next slide.

00;10;02;27 - 00;10;32;25

Henry Sokolski

Well, then we had some talks with our vice president and secretary of state, with a very senior aide to Netanyahu. And this was reported, they're trying to figure out, well, when do we when do we greenlight, Israeli, nuclear operations, or I should say non-nuclear operations? Misstatement, bombing of the Iranian nuclear facilities, and materials again.

00;10;32;27 - 00;10;57;06

Henry Sokolski

And they came up with this and they let the press know about it. Well, if they try to remove uranium that we believe is in these three facilities for no Natanz in this form or in they start rebuilding their program and enrichment facilities. And I'm not sure what the trip would be for rebuilding and what that means.

00;10;57;06 - 00;11;15;29

Henry Sokolski

But I suppose a certain amount of this is like, in the eye holder. You may never escape that subjectivity entirely, but, you know, this is a little bit more and then let's see what else came out. Next slide.

00;11;16;01 - 00;11;38;28

Henry Sokolski

Now we have a spokesperson from the State Department. Saying what's acceptable. That's unacceptable. That to suspend cooperation with the IAEA, which of course Iran did. But they said, well, you can call us when you want to come back. And if we like what you're suggesting, we might let you in. So, they they've been pretty coy about that.

00;11;38;29 - 00;12;00;18

Henry Sokolski

I mean, there is no, requirement under the IAEA charter that you have inspectors, resident constantly. I mean, they're supposed to make a request, and you get the right to review who it is there. And the that they're sending on the inspection team and what they're going to inspect. And there's certain things you can talk about.

00;12;00;21 - 00;12;32;12

Henry Sokolski

So, they're playing that card, but no, they must cooperate fully with their safeguard's agreement, under the NPT, without further delay. Without further delay. Well, they've already a, like, a little, So I don't know what further delay means. Provide the information to clarify undeclared nuclear material, which is required under their agreement. When the IAEA and provide unrestricted access to new enrichment facilities.

00;12;32;14 - 00;13;05;29

Henry Sokolski

Okay, now, actually, they got this a little wrong. If you read the IAEA agreement on the so-called information circular 153, you only need to give access once special nuclear material, which is described as, slightly enriched or lightly enriched, low enriched, a real term, uranium, separate plutonium, thorium, etc., is present. And if it isn't, you're not.

00;13;06;01 - 00;13;29;20

Henry Sokolski

You have to say that you're going to introduce this material in a certain amount of time prior to doing so, but you can kind of fudge that a little. But in any case, this may be a new way of thinking about it. We're not restricted by the IAEA, just agreement. And maybe we should have something more. Maybe that's an indication that that we're pushing for that.

00;13;29;22 - 00;14;09;06

Henry Sokolski

All right. Next slide. Now, another possibility is that if the IAEA reports, a lot of noncompliance, possibilities without yet determining that it's non-compliant, it might be a trigger to action. There was such a report May 31st by the IAEA and Netanyahu more or less used that publicly to say that they were very concerned. And, we I suspect that a certain amount of military operational planning may have been under way even by May 1st.

00;14;09;08 - 00;14;17;14

I Henry Sokolski

t's a possibility. I mean, I can't say that I really know. Go to the next slide. However.

00;14;17;17 - 00;14;51;07

Henry Sokolski

Well, then they finally decided to use the non-compliant word. The N-word, if you will. Well, it constitutes noncompliance. Yeah. This is very rare that the IAEA does this extremely rare. Well, as soon as they did that, what happened next? This is June 12th. Next slide. Oops. It looks like somebody thought that was a triggering event. Now you can't prove this, but it is more than interesting.

00;14;51;10 - 00;15;23;06

Henry Sokolski

Coincidental that it wasn't more than some hours after that. The release of that determination that the bombing began. So maybe we're waiting upon the IAEA to make certain determinations before we bomb. You know, consider the part of the in question. It's the Israelis. I mean, is this that's true. That's interesting because, you know, the Israelis, are not entirely a law bound, internationally law bound, operation the way maybe other countries are.

00;15;23;08 - 00;15;42;21

Speaker 1

So that if it's true, I mean, this is all speculation on my part, but if it's true that they waited until they got the determination. That's interesting. It suggests that most countries might not do it before then either. But I don't know yet. But that's the possibility. Just think about, you know, do you want to use that as a red line?

00;15;42;24 - 00;16;12;03

Speaker 1

Okay. Next. Okay. Now, I always say when you kick, this sort of a, hornet's nest. You want to find out just how many bees are in there? I think they're more. I mean, otherwise, why not let ourselves blue sky? The question of are there other rules or guidelines that we might want to consider this point?

00;16;12;05 - 00;16;33;08

Speaker 1

I'm going to throw some things at you. I don't know if it's an exhaustive list, and I'd be curious to hear, you know, your thoughts on. Well, gee, you know, how about this, this and this. We will have a discussion period. So let's see, you know, a little at least what I've got here. Next slide.

00;16;33;11 - 00;16;59;08

Speaker 1

Well, I like grinding my ax here. So I've had an ax. I've been grinding for a good many years that the International Atomic Energy Agency's numbers are just dead wrong. One of them is how much does it take to make a bomb? And they're they they're off by, you know, factors of 2 to 2, two or more.

00;16;59;13 - 00;17;21;10

Speaker 1

I would say, you know, they say takes eight kilograms to make a plutonium bomb. Well, you know, it was really advanced technology. It might take 1 or 2, but, in the same with highly enriched uranium, they have a figure that's 25. Well, I could be way off. One way to try to think about what the number ought to be is.

00;17;21;10 - 00;17;52;27

Speaker 1

I think they picked those numbers because they wanted to make sure that folks couldn't make it first generation Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapon. And I think what they were trying to avoid was a Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which is, say, a lot of dead people, a lot of innocents, I might add. Being killed. So if you take a look at those particular bombing operations, both were conducted at about 1500 feet.

00;17;53;00 - 00;18;23;08

Speaker 1

Now at 1500 feet, to get Hiroshima and Nagasaki effects, you need 15 to 20 kilotons, roughly of explosive energy. But if you chose to do what we're most interested in as advanced nuclear weapon states, and I say we I mean, for Russia, the United States and even Great Britain, Israel and, Pakistan, India, you know, all of them, North Korea and France.

00;18;23;11 - 00;18;54;05

Speaker 1

You want to do precise strikes and you might want to have ground first, and you have very low yields. Well, it turns out if you set off a weapon with just 1/20, the yield of Nagasaki at one kiloton at ground level, not 1500 feet, the radiation that spewed up kills the exact, almost the exact same number of people as just, you know, sending it off with 20 kilotons at, 1500 feet.

00;18;54;05 - 00;19;24;23

Henry Sokolski

So maybe we ought to have a number that's geared to one kiloton devices. You start looking at that, and you start looking at real modern knowledge about what kinds of weapons, even the first generation, developers of nuclear weapons, use. Like Iran, they don't use crude designs. Their designs, or at least, the designs of the 1950s.

00;19;24;26 - 00;20;06;07

Henry Sokolski

What does that mean? Well, maybe you need to tighten up those numbers and come down dramatically if you do. What does that do? Well, it drives up the frequency of the inspections dramatically. Okay. So that's one thing you might think about. The other is and I remember, succeeding in setting up a division, in the IAEA and a number of meetings in Europe, and finally got them convinced that they should have an office that looks at what we need to do to

safeguard against military diversions, not just, they don't really have an office to do this, believe it or not.

00;20;06;09 - 00;20;31;14

Henry Sokolski

For the long term, you know, the next 20 years, you know, what kinds of long-term investments of planning and ideas should they have? So, they set this up. And I met the first fellow who had the honor of running it, and he said, well, what can we do? I said, well, why don't I give you an idea that it doesn't cost anything, just distinguish between what you can monitor, and what you can save.

00;20;31;17 - 00;20;56;24

Henry Sokolski

I said, well, what's the difference? As it was the big difference. Things that are close to being a bomb, like enriched uranium or separate tonerms, or the activities that can produce that material very quickly. You can't get a reliable detection of a diversion early enough to prevent the thing from turning into a bomb before you can do anything when you that's manageable.

00;20;56;24 - 00;21;17;24

Henry Sokolski

And that's a lot of the dangerous materials and activities that we just bombed in Iran. What's safe, veritable, are things where you can detect a beginning of a diversion and you have enough time. And I would say it's measured at least in months, if not longer, to intervene internationally to prevent it from turning into a bomb. You said, oh, that's brilliant.

00;21;17;27 - 00;21;43;21

Henry Sokolski

I said, you won't get anywhere. I said, why? He said, well, because the bureaucracy here and elsewhere won't want you to make that distinction. Maybe, maybe now we should. This then raises something that we could attend to here in the United States. We have a law on the books. The Atomic Energy Act is amended in 1978 by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

00;21;43;28 - 00;22;13;20

Henry Sokolski

And it says that we shouldn't export, certain things or surely shouldn't approve of the subsequent, treatment of our fuel, either by reprocessing or other processes. Unless we could have timely warning of a military diversion. But now this requirement, which is on the books, is never been enforced. And I maybe we've got to pass a law saying, well, we should do it.

00;22;13;23 - 00;22;40;09

Henry Sokolski

I don't know, but that's something to consider. That would probably change what it is we would export and change what we would think was safe and dangerous. All right. Next slide. You can see I'm lobbying here. But you know you don't have to buy these arguments, but you want to think about them. Here's another consideration. This man Mr. Baruch took, what job?

00;22;40;09 - 00;23;07;03

Henry Sokolski

Robert Oppenheimer managed to get the Acheson Lillienthal report. A panel to accept, and he

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rejected it. Well, what did he what did he push? One of the things he pushed that through, I think rightly, rejected, was the idea that any violation of the rules should be perceived as a cause for going to total war against that country.

00;23;07;05 - 00;23;29;26

Henry Sokolski

So, if the country began to mine uranium, Oppenheimer and the ashes and the Lilienthal report, the panel said, well, we'll just go to war. You know, this this is the first act of atomic war. I think the lawyer like character, Mr. Baruch, when he came in and he said, that sounds totally nuts. Yeah. The punishments should be confined or the sanctions.

00;23;29;26 - 00;24;04;22

Henry Sokolski

In other words, you need to have think about violations of whatever rules you come up with and scale them so that you know the worst violation has the worst punishment, etc. they need to be proportionate. I don't know that we've even thought about that, all these decades. Well, maybe now's the time to start thinking about that. Do we want to treat, the, you know, let's say a technical violation of the IAEA with regard to giving notice of the introduction of special.

00;24;04;25 - 00;24;20;04

Henry Sokolski

Sure material, the same as, the discovery that you're actually making a nuclear weapon. I mean, you know, how does this work? And what would be proportionate? Okay. Next slide.

00;24;20;07 - 00;24;41;07

Henry Sokolski

Oh, here's a nice thing to start thinking about. You know, when should we accept a nation as being a nuclear state. Now we still have regulations on the book that say you're never if you have a clearance to actually say publicly Israel has nuclear weapons. So, I guess we're still in denial of that, that one. But yeah, that's a little kooky to India.

00;24;41;07 - 00;25;03;27

Henry Sokolski

I think we came around the UN, but it took a long time. We kept saying that they only had a peaceful nuclear explosive. Well, we don't see that anymore. Same with Pakistan. But it took a while, and I remember being in the Pentagon and being instructed, to not admit that we finally we're going to sanction them because they were on their way to making nuclear weapons.

00;25;03;27 - 00;25;23;21

Henry Sokolski

And I said, well, I got to testify to our bosses. I said, who are our bosses? I said, what Congress? I ignored it. I gave that testimony. And so, you know, we finally admitted that they were getting a bomb. North Korea. Well, we're still kind of teasing on the question of whether they have. We should say they have nuclear weapons, right?

00;25;23;24 - 00;25;43;20

Henry Sokolski

The South Koreans are adamant that we not say that, we're not going to reverse that. And so they don't like us saying they're a nuclear weapon state. Well, and then, of course, question of

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the day now is Iran. Well, you might want to think about, you know, is there a threshold when you say, okay, uncle or not?

00;25;43;23 - 00;26;02;29

Henry Sokolski

You know, you might even come to the conclusion, maybe you should never accept these things and say, well, they're all, and, on probation if we want to, you know, get them to go backwards. There are all sorts of possibilities here. We want to think about that. Next thing, next slide. I should say I apologize.

00;26;03;01 - 00;26;27;29

Henry Sokolski

Oh, this is my favorite. Should we export what we just bombed? Now, this is a little inflammatory, but it's my job, I guess, to be a little inflammatory. You know, we are now committing ourselves to export reactors that use something called high, say, low enriched uranium. Well. What's that? Well, it's about 20% enriched uranium.

00;26;28;02 - 00;26;56;05

Henry Sokolski

Well, you go over to the right, you see the science magazine. There's a essay by a bunch of folks, who are physicists who discovered that the Atomic Energy Commission back in the 50s said, you know, anything much above 12% is weapons usable, and you can deliver it. Well, they caused quite a stir in the Department of Energy and the Biden administration, kind of, I don't know, give or stated a bit.

00;26;56;05 - 00;27;17;28

Henry Sokolski

And, and then, finally said, all right, well, let the National Academy of Sciences study this. Well, the election occurred. Guess what? They. We don't want any study. Okay, but you know what? If these characters in the Atomic Energy Commission are right, should we be exporting this? I mean, is it an issue or not? Do we want to study that?

00;27;18;01 - 00;27;44;05

Henry Sokolski

Then we we're also promoting Oklo. And, natrium, which are basically versions, in one case, very directly versions of a fast breeder reactor and can be reconfigured to be that. Well, what does that matter? Well, that's of the fertile material around the core of a fast breeder reactor. Isn't just weapons usable or weapons grade.

00;27;44;09 - 00;28;12;19

Henry Sokolski

It's super weapons grade, which means it's extremely. You need far less of it to make, given yield. And you can blend it with other stuff that's not so good to make it work. Do you want to export that? And then, of course, the question of the moment. Not that long ago, our new secretary of energy said, well, we should be able to figure out a way to help the Saudis enrich uranium.

00;28;12;19 - 00;28;38;15

Henry Sokolski

And that'd be part of a nuclear cooperative agreement, which we'll have in several months. Is that a good idea? I mean, I don't know. Do you want to look at that again? All right. Next slide. Oh, this is a long-term headache, but a fun one. What about nuclear sharing? Now, the Russians shared nuclear weapons to Belarus.

00;28;38;18 - 00;29;06;11

Henry Sokolski

What if they moved weapons into occupied Ukraine? Or possibly. You know, if they succeed wildly in their efforts to take over Moldova, maybe in Moldova, would that be a proliferation concern? I don't know. How about Russian nuclear assistance to Cuba, which comes on and off occasionally. Or Iranian missiles or, gulp, nuclear transfers of some sort.

00;29;06;17 - 00;29;35;01

Henry Sokolski

Who knows? I mean, you know, admittedly, this is a little wild haired stuff, but it's not inconceivable. Pakistani nuclear assistance to the Saudis that's been talked about quite a lot. North Korean nuclear help to Myanmar. Chinese nuclear have to that as well. And then here's one. What is the Russians? Transferred? Nuclear. He said systems to North Korea.

00;29;35;04 - 00;30;01;28

Henry Sokolski

Now, my operation gained, a nuclear asset that North Korea uses. It's quite nasty. Legally. Because they actually more or less can do it, by some interpretations of, violating international law. I don't know. These, again, are very speculative, but we're going to get into the question of nuclear sharing. I fear more than we think.

00;30;01;28 - 00;30;13;13

Henry Sokolski

And we are not paying much attention to this. When you pay less attention to a problem, sometimes it becomes more probable. Next slide.

00;30;13;15 - 00;30;40;11

Henry Sokolski

Well, here's an old favorite from, I think 20, 20-some-odd years of my center and others have taken up the control and try to work this. Not with much success, I might add. If you violate a contract, you have a neighbor violates an agreement. You have. And he announces, well, I know I signed a pledge to do something, but I've decided I want to, and I'm withdrawing from the contract.

00;30;40;14 - 00;31;02;17

Henry Sokolski

You can take them to court and win. They can't withdraw from a contract if they're in noncompliance with it. Well, this is to apply to the NPT, which is coming up for review next April. I don't know what we're going to say there, but, you know, one of the things that was attempted, I think, in 2010 was to say, you got to come into full compliance before you leave.

00;31;02;19 - 00;31;23;08

Henry Sokolski

Now, why did anyone try to make that argument? Well, we let the North Koreans off the hook

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when they were in noncompliance and didn't do a darn thing. And then, well, three years later, they set off a nuclear weapon. Is that how we're going to deal with Iran? Do we want to say anything about that before Iran might do something like that?

00;31;23;10 - 00;31;49;17

Henry Sokolski

What about other countries? Also, perhaps we should convert all the safeguards agreements to something called Information Circular 66, which does not depend on whether you're a member of the NPT. So if you withdraw from the NPT, you still have to have your nuclear activities that are civilian and materials, inspected. These are all possibilities. Next slide.

00;31;49;19 - 00;32;15;03

Henry Sokolski

Well, okay. I've been in Washington too long not to be familiar with ridicule, but, you know, some say, well, rules are for fools, you know? I floated some of these ideas in the last, you know, 2 or 3 weeks. And, you know, one fellow said, well, you need to have freedom of action. I said, like Milosevic, you know, in Serbia, that's that was his entire strategy.

00;32;15;04 - 00;32;44;04

Henry Sokolski

Of course, he ended up in and then the brink. But, you know, if you want to maximize freedom of action, you don't like rules. You don't like policy, even. And what you emphasize as well, you know, each case is different. And, you know, you really can't say in advance. And so, you know, this means that when you feel in your bones that you're threatened, you act, now it turns out that there's a whole school of thought.

00;32;44;09 - 00;33;10;09

Henry Sokolski

They got rolling before the First World War, which talked about, dare I say, deterrence, which is interesting. The argument was that, well, everyone arming up to the teeth in Europe was not going to be a big deal because the people in Europe were highly educated and they would deter one another. That did not work out so well in the 20th century at all.

00;33;10;12 - 00;33;27;04

Henry Sokolski

At least for the First and Second World War. Now, you know, I think, we did a much better job after the Second World War, but it was touch and go. All right. Now, what's the next slide?

00;33;27;07 - 00;33;49;02

Henry Sokolski

Well, this is a scold, I guess, but yeah, but I suppose when you're in the nonprofit world and you, you have no influence, you try to scold people. I don't know if this works, but, you know, if you start thinking about what happens without remorse, you know, there are other folks that have, you know, existential threats that they feel strongly about.

00;33;49;09 - 00;34;16;06

Henry Sokolski

I'm sure Russia thinks Ukraine was making nuclear weapons or they claimed it. What what will happen with regard to the Poland's nuclear program? Might they take a look at what the

leadership in Poland is saying about possibly considering making nuclear weapons and want to bomb that stuff? Germany certainly would be an issue. Now, admittedly, their reactors are dormant, but of course they're talking about possibly reopening.

00;34;16;06 - 00;34;46;25

Henry Sokolski

So how does this work? You if you have a suspect existential threat, you have the right to act. Okay. Well, maybe if we were the only actors, that would work fine. But you can have Russian actors, and then they're Chinese actors. With regard to certainly Taiwan. And they, they have talked about in their military planning, doing operations against nuclear plants there.

00;34;46;28 - 00;35;13;17

Henry Sokolski

Well, I don't know where to go further. Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. You know, even the Chinese feel like they might have their nuclear plants, bombarded. So, it's not like they don't think someone might do it to them. Therefore, I'm sure they might think of possibly doing it. Someone else. What about North Korea? They've actually publicly threatened to attack nuclear plants in Japan.

00;35;13;19 - 00;35;39;03

Henry Sokolski

And not, you know, as nuclear weapons plants. And certainly, the Chinese see the ricochet plant, this enormous reprocessing plant, as a weapons facility. And they've said so. All right, I've opened the hood on that. Well, enough already. Let's transition to what you might want to do about it. Next slide.

00;35;39;05 - 00;36;14;25

Henry Sokolski

Now. Oh, I suppose it's hopeless. If you're proposing anything that might be interesting, to be thoroughly understood. I mean, if anything...if you propose something new, it's sure to be misinterpreted and mischaracterized by someone. But, you know, this is the risk we all take. I want to be clear. I answered the Pentagon, with the goal so many decades ago of making nonproliferation a military mission.

00;36;14;27 - 00;36;38;16

Henry Sokolski

And I don't think I succeeded. I mean, I managed to stand up some research and some war games and, you know, get people to think about what this would entail. But I don't think I got very far. But it may be that you'll want to do that still. And I'll tell you why. It's very hard to get policy people to think about all the questions that we just went through.

00;36;38;18 - 00;37;35;04

Henry Sokolski

Unless they think something's going to happen that they won't have control over. If they don't. And one of the deficiencies and the non-serious characteristics of nonproliferation, I would argue, is there's not much emphasis on the enforcement syllable. And so, the policymakers get kind of complacent. I, once, tried to, and I convinced the CIA to set up an office, and they even put me on an advisory board to, think about nuclear and other futures we didn't want and figure out how to create national intelligence, tasking to make clear whether we were moving in the

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wrong direction, and to get policy people to be an integral part of this,

00;37;35;07 - 00;37;59;11

Speaker 1

this group of policy people never came. Why? Why would you commit yourself to try to do something if you weren't sure you were going to succeed? All right. Well, so the way you might be able to square the circle. And this is the driving thought behind what I'm going to talk about now is if you set up, a, command, actually, it's, I've been like, what?

00;37;59;11 - 00;38;25;11

Speaker 1

You can correct me and say it should be somewhere else. That's fine. But somewhere like that, that would have the tasking of, Essentially, doing the enforcement militarily of whatever red line had been crossed. And if you did that, there'd be proper creative tension with the policy, making sure you figure out what those red lines might be.

00;38;25;13 - 00;38;33;26

Speaker 1

I think that's what's lacking. So let's go in and take a look at what that might like. Be a good idea.

00;38;33;28 - 00;38;57;03

Speaker 1

Next slide. Well, it's got to be said that, we, we did sort of arguably do this. I mean, we did some bombing of the tollways at the center and we just did some bombing, so you could say nonproliferation enforcement's not brand new, which is very important policy. I mean, if you if you try to do something brand new, good luck.

00;38;57;05 - 00;39;08;15

Speaker 1

But we've we've kind of already put on this, wardrobe once before. It's not unprecedented. Next slide.

00;39;08;17 - 00;39;30;05

Speaker 1

Also, you know, people say, oh, well, you know, trying to hit, facilities that are sensitive and deep and hard is just a subset of, you know, going after Russian and Chinese deep structures. Well, maybe, and then they say, well, so it's a lesser included problem, and you don't need to pay any extra attention to it.

00;39;30;10 - 00;39;53;10

Henry Sokolski

Well, you could argue that, but it's worth noting that we exhausted our magazine of mops. And, you know, I think we get down to about five of them or something, and, and we nearly use the entire bomber fleet just to do this one night of bombing. I mean, our most sensitive, strategic, nuclear capable bombers, which are pretty important.

00;39;53;12 - 00;40;06;11

Henry Sokolski

Mind you, this is after having planned for 15 years. Well, that doesn't tell me that this isn't a very stressful case. Just the opposite. Next slide.

00;40;06;13 - 00;40;38;20

Henry Sokolski

And there already is an admission, you know, follow what people say. Less than what they do. We're already, trying to upgrade the Massive Ordnance Penetrator. We're already developing a new one, because the old one doesn't use very energetic explosives. It doesn't really fit neatly in a the 21. And, you know, we may need to have a hardened case change the fusing of many larger numbers.

00;40;38;22 - 00;41;07;00

Henry Sokolski

Cyber-attack strategies, may have to be changed constantly. If you're serious about getting away from bombers, you might want to have. Are you ready for this? I will, I had a fractional orbiting bombardment system, you know, that? Maybe delivered by space X or Falcon nine, that would have the payload, and the accuracy to do the work, and then you wouldn't have to have such brave pilots.

00;41;07;07 - 00;41;13;08

Henry Sokolski

They wouldn't be in the loop. Next slide.

00;41;13;10 - 00;41;40;02

Henry Sokolski

I think you also might have to restructure the intelligence community, because you want to work backwards, for futures. You don't want to spend your time analyzing a bomb damage assessment or looking at images of things that you were supposed to prevent from coming into being. And I, I've written on this, if anyone's interested. And there was a furtive effort, some 30 years ago, to stand up an office to do this.

00;41;40;02 - 00;42;22;26

Henry Sokolski

But I think we need to revisit that again. I think we got to definitely reduce our reliance on intelligence from the CIA and, dare I say, from Israel. I mean, we have got to start taking this mission more seriously and stand up, independent sources of information. And then there's this, which is a kind of excursion, you know, if you want to prevent nuclear weapons from exploding in space and destroying Golden Dome and all of our, you know, Starlink and other similar constellations, we may need to know more, than we currently do about where nuclear weapons materials are and where they might be transported to launch sites.

00;42;22;28 - 00;42;49;11

Henry Sokolski

Now, this is, not a fix, but, something you'd want to know more about from here on out. Okay. Next slide. Okay. Well, you know, you would put the command underneath Stratcom and you'd have someone from state. Do you know, as of early, and then you'd have them report back the offices where strapped on would have to leak, and you would have creative tension.

00;42;49;14 - 00;43;15;10

Henry Sokolski

Next slide. Okay. We're done. It might be. It's a good time to look where we're going, where we're headed. I know this is in our tendency. We like to look backwards, but forwards. Okay. We're in the nonprofit world where we do policy. It's what we should be doing. So, let's open it up.

00;43;15;13 - 00;43;40;14

Peter Huessy

Henry, as usual. Wonderful presentation. I've written three questions that I put in the chat, and I think I've asked you one of them already under a different, different, forum. But is there a right to enrich under either the NPT or international law?

00;43;40;16 - 00;44;01;23

Henry Sokolski

I would argue you can stand up an argument. That the answer is no. And the reason I say that's one of the first things I did when I created my nonprofit, was I spent a year trying to read the entire, negotiating history of the NPT, which is like a ten-year period or so, and it's quite long.

00;44;01;28 - 00;44;22;07

Henry Sokolski

Yes. Now, I didn't read everything, but I read a lot. And what I found is that there were points in the negotiation where the Swedes and the Brits and even developing nations, representatives would say, well, of course we can't. We can't let countries make nuclear fuel because that's too close to bomb making. That can't be a right to that.

00;44;22;10 - 00;44;46;24

Henry Sokolski

And everyone said, you know, that's a very good point. We'll get back to that later. And they never did. Never did. Never did. And I think what we've done is tried to make our mistakes hereditary. We wanted to reassure the Japanese that, yeah, they could they could stockpile plutonium and reprocess. To be honest, it was a kind of a wink for dealing with China.

00;44;46;27 - 00;45;07;26

Henry Sokolski

I mean, I think the arguments are starting to look that way. And we did, for different reasons, to get, economy and political unity in the European Union. Give this right to the nations that asked for it, that were part of your atom. And then, of course, Argentina and then Brazil and then South Africa and then India.

00;45;07;28 - 00;45;34;25

Henry Sokolski

Okay. But, you know, I studied under a man, Albert Wilson. I was very fond of saying what I've said twice already. There is no reason you need to make your mistakes hereditary. You could say we made a mistake. Let's stop. So, you know, good luck with this. I mean, this is maybe a prescription for being looked down upon and possibly fired, but it doesn't mean you're wrong.

00;45;34;27 - 00;46;05;28

Peter Huessy

Well, a part of it is if you had. If you decide we can't admit we made that mistake, we'll just keep

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winking. And unfortunately, it gets you. Get you in trouble. Now I'm. We use military action, or the Israelis did. With respect to Syria reactor, which looked like the North Koreans were building a replica. The Israelis also took out the Iraq reactor.

00;46;06;01 - 00;46;35;07

Peter Huessy

But a number of years later, when we pushed the Iraq out of Kuwait, we said, Holy cow, they're in chaos. And Butler said they were six months away from having a nuclear weapons capability. And then Libya took what Fran Townsend told me was the not the Saddam option. It was, okay, I'll give it up. But not to the U.N., but to the United States and Great Britain.

00;46;35;09 - 00;46;53;28

Peter Huessy

And then we have what's going on in Iran is we've used military force. On the other hand, in South Africa, I think we talked out of its nuclear weapons diplomatically. And I think we did that with Brazil and South Korea and others. But they were in on the road toward their partner.

00;46;54;00 - 00;46;56;09

Henry Sokolski

Tell me there's a question coming.

00;46;56;11 - 00;47;03;24

Peter Huessy

Are there lessons we've learned from any of this? Well, what would be the lessons that you would tell us? You should know.

00;47;03;24 - 00;47;27;17

Henry Sokolski

From the jump in the ladder, as far as you know, speaking on other people's behalf as to what they've learned. You know, I don't think I'm in a position to say much, but I tell you what I take from that. Having been involved in the South African and Argentine case with the missiles that were nuclear capable and, knowing a lot about the Libyan case.

00;47;27;19 - 00;47;55;06

Henry Sokolski

It's very important. And this is going to stick in the crop. An awful lot of hardheaded people who I'm very friendly with. You know, I come from conservative roots myself. You need to give violators a law to escape to behave. And if you just lean on them and say you will do as I tell you, it does not work as well.

00;47;55;08 - 00;48;21;01

Henry Sokolski

You can do it, but it's really hard to keep it stuck down. But if you can say, look, you agreed to these rules, you violate them. Then they could say, well, okay, we'll come back into compliance. And it is not as toxic as saying, well, we'll do what you told us to do. And so the utility of international law may be marginal, but it's not zero.

00;48;21;04 - 00;48;42;24

Henry Sokolski

And I think, you know, when you go to the extreme, by the way, John Bolton is very good on this. And so was some of the key tough birds at the turn of the century. They understood that international law was a way to get what you want without war. If you do it right, if you do it right.

00;48;42;26 - 00;49;09;04

Henry Sokolski

And, I think we've lost our flair for that. We haven't been doing it right. So that's one thing I take away from it. And the other is, by the way, this this this becomes very important thinking about Japan and to a lesser extent, South Korea. I talked with the Japanese, left this one said she said, you know, we will not get the bomb if we think the rules are being upheld because we're a very hierarchical society.

00;49;09;06 - 00;49;32;13

Henry Sokolski

It's as soon as we think the rules aren't being followed, then we're not under any compulsion to follow them either. That's interesting. You know, and it's just a point. It's a subtle point, but it's pretty important. So, I think having rules and policies, if you can, agreed to by a large number of nations is preferable to just having your own rules and no one else agreeing with you.

00;49;32;15 - 00;49;36;09

Henry Sokolski

So, there's a scale. I don't know if that helps.

00;49;36;11 - 00;49;52;04

Peter Huessy

Yeah, we have another question. And that is what about the Nuclear Suppliers Group? The question we had is why have they not been as successful or successful in curtailing proliferation? It maybe they have I don't know. What's your sense?

00;49;52;06 - 00;50;18;06

Henry Sokolski

Well, again, you know, here we go. I haven't touched you on international rules and policies. Now I'm going to tell you. Well, they don't always work. But I think with the group, the problem has always been this question of what's safe and dangerous and how hardnosed you're going to be. And I think they the United States, oddly enough, has been very helpful.

00;50;18;06 - 00;50;42;02

Henry Sokolski

And both sides of the argument. And that's not great. You want them. You want us to be leaning with our thumb on the scale of no. Well, so, you know, when we got to India, well, you know, they do. You know, I think the Indian agreement, in short, was very expensive to the prospect of that organization working. That's the short answer.

00;50;42;05 - 00;50;43;05

Henry Sokolski

Okay.

00;50;43;07 - 00;51;13;09

Peter Huessy

Yes. Okay. Another question I had was doesn't enforcement or require inspections because I didn't know what they're... But inspections and require transparency. So perhaps you have to start all the way at the beginning is okay, what are the guys have, what are they doing? And is some of what they're doing? Well, that doesn't matter because it's so small and insignificant, which you raised in your remarks.

00;51;13;09 - 00;51;22;02

Peter Huessy

So how do you get transparency in a country like Iran or others that are transparent to begin with on anything?

00;51;22;04 - 00;51;49;20

Henry Sokolski

Well, first of all, this is a little bit like keeping your weight down after age 30. If you got the added all the time and yes, you're right, you will gain weight. Okay. However, less is better. I think the only two answers you have to be tougher about what it is. These international organizations should have the standards and be willing to be to risk being unpopular for a while.

00;51;49;23 - 00;52;25;24

Henry Sokolski

And that's point one. But, I don't think we've shown much courage on that front. The other thing I think you've got to do is you've got to actually have an intelligence agency that has a mission to get on top of these kinds of questions more than it has, more than it has. And, you know, I know the, you know, people say, you know, like Nixon was very distrustful of the intelligence agencies and believe me, having worked, you know, a little bit with them, there's plenty to be dissatisfied with.

00;52;25;26 - 00;52;45;18

Henry Sokolski

But at some levels you're stuck. It's the only government you got, and you got to work it. I think making people feel badly about certain things is a start. I think we've been too comfortable, with letting things just unfold the way they have.

00;52;45;20 - 00;53;13;19

Peter Huessy

It's interesting. I'm not going to repeat it anyway, but we have this very long give and take about small modular reactors. One person arguing that they're just crazy ideas on websites, but not real. What's your sense as to are they going to harm proliferation nonproliferation efforts? Is it something we ought to pursue? Where are we in this entire area?

00;53;13;21 - 00;53;40;26

Henry Sokolski

But you're talking to a former heritage first visiting scholar, and back then they were consistent about not commercializing anything and subsidizing anything commercial. I kind of like that. It's a sort of a almost libertarian stripe. I've always held on to that thought, and I think we need to lean into it. And the reason why is we don't know if our car is going to plug into our house or our house.

00;53;40;26 - 00;53;58;08

Henry Sokolski

They're going to plug into our car. If we act with so much great confidence about knowledge about AI, even though the industry is everywhere, if you look at the media, you don't want to do generative AI and you look at someone else. Oh, we got to do it. We don't know what the customer base will be. We don't know so many things.

00;53;58;15 - 00;54;24;12

Henry Sokolski

When you do not know something, you try to reduce your risk by turning to the government. We should not let them do that. If you will. I look at, a lot of the nuclear programs today, like, I look at the ethanol program, which, you know, we loved farmers, and we were we but we hated having to appropriate for them.

00;54;24;14 - 00;54;59;29

Henry Sokolski

And what we did is we gave them, a mandate to make a product, and we gave it a story that it was, ecologically, fantastic stuff, which it isn't a true narrative. And now everyone from Ted Cruz to anyone with Birkenstocks rails against this and gets nowhere. Why? It's off budget. I would put the small modular reactor and all the other nuclear commercial programs on a strict diet of being either on budget.

00;55;00;04 - 00;55;17;09

Henry Sokolski

Or out there in the market. We have not done that. And if you don't do that, you're not going to get a very good reactor. And you may get a lot of stuff you'll regret, like ethanol. How's that?

00;55;17;11 - 00;55;30;19

Peter Huessy

Well, here you've got ethanol, right? For sure. It's just it's not a good thing ecologically or environmentally in the whole thing. But boy, everybody says there's a primary in Iowa, so we have to help the farmers.

00;55;30;22 - 00;55;52;18

Henry Sokolski

Well, we are deferring to the tech rose now. They're the new farmers. Yes. And so, you know, if you ask someone, if it's walk away safe and, the radiation won't go beyond the gates. Fine. I'm all for it. But then we you don't need to have a cap on your liability if you're wrong.

00;55;52;18 - 00;56;11;00

Henry Sokolski

Right. And they scream, oh, no, no, we need that. Well, there's a problem here. Thank you. Yeah. And so, I say, you know, we should start using market signals much more for all the energy, answers and not try to pick the winners.

00;56;11;02 - 00;56;34;04

Peter Huessy

No, I hear you. We're at, three minutes of the hour and I want to turn it back over to our president for any final words, but, And then, Kimberly, if she has any announcements. But, Henry, you've got 30s to tell us. Summarize what you have told us today. What do we come

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away with?

00;56;34;06 - 00;57;01;06

Henry Sokolski

Well, sort of like, Yogi Berra, you know, said, when you come to a fork in the road, take it. I think we got to at least recognize we're at a fork. We have choices. We are too quiet. We are too confident, and we are too afraid. I would recommend avoiding all of those extremes and start talking about the questions that were raised.

00;57;01;08 - 00;57;10;03

Henry Sokolski

It's okay not to solve everything. It's not okay not to talk about it. And we are not talking about this properly.

00;57;10;05 - 00;57;13;22

Peter Huessy

Well said, Sir Jim, over to you, sir.

00;57;13;25 - 00;57;40;05

James Petrosky

Excellent sage advice from you. Henry, I greatly appreciate this. Yeah. You cover a lot of territory, and our listeners, will probably take something away. Probably, in my opinion. Maybe not agree, which is good. That's why we talk about things, in some things. And it agree strongly with other things that you've had to say. So that's all part of the conversation because this is a very difficult problem to solve.

00;57;40;08 - 00;57;54;16

James Petrosky

So, I'm not going to add any additional comments for our questions because our, our listeners, put a bunch of them up here and we'll send those to you, Henry, so that you can see those questions. You can answer them yourself if you wish.

00;57;54;19 - 00;58;21;22

Henry Sokolski

There is one thing I must say. I must say, if you haven't applied to the nonproliferation policy education centers, nuclear policy fundamentals, civil military, certificate course. It's a shame. You still can. You don't pay a nickel for it. It's already been fundraised. And properly, you can take a look and we will make available to anyone who came here.

00;58;21;24 - 00;58;24;11

Henry Sokolski

That material.

00;58;24;13 - 00;58;38;23

James Petrosky

Okay. Excellent, I appreciate that. I'm going to turn it over to Kimberly to close out, talk about our future. If you use the seminars while some other activity with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Go ahead there. Kimberly.

00;58;38;26 - 00;59;13;09

Kimberly Cherington

Well, thank you, everyone, for being here. I want a special thanks to Henry Sokolski for helping us bring this conversation to a wider audience. And just wanted to remind you that NIDS is a 501 C3 nonprofit dedicated to advancing the peace and promoting stability through a strong national security and nuclear deterrent. We do this by offering a wide range of deterrence education, from live and virtual events like this one to podcasts, publications, workshops and courses through our NIDS Academy.

00;59;13;12 - 00;59;45;12

Kimberly Cherington

Looking ahead, mark your calendars for some of these other virtual UC seminars. Our next one, August 1st, is with Ambassador Eric Edelman and Honorable Frank Miller on renewing U.S. Russian arms control framework. And why that is no longer sufficient in today's multipolar nuclear environment. On August 15th, we have deterrence dynamics in the Asia Pacific with Dr. Christine Leah, an Australian perspective, which should be interesting.

00;59;45;15 - 01;00;11;01

Kimberly Cherington

And don't miss that. They also have a group Deterrence Down Under who does a, twice a month podcast. And we'd love for you to tune into that. And get to know some of the issues happening in that Indo-Pacific region. On August 29th, we have Dr Christopher Ford. Who's talking about Iran deterrence and the future of nonproliferation.

01;00;11;03 - 01;00;45;19

Kimberly Cherington

We have Matt Kroenig, who was mentioned today in, Henry's wonderful presentation on nuclear priorities for Trump. 2.0. So, also, if you happen to be in, independence, Missouri, around August 6th, we have a one-day conference, Peace Through Strength, 80 years later, this timely event is co-hosted by us and the Truman Library. And we will be bringing national security experts, military leaders and scholars to examine the nuclear weapons role in global security. We have a whole lineup of speakers all summer and fall, so make sure to look for those and register at [thinkdeterrence.com](http://thinkdeterrence.com) on our Events page, and feel free to email me at [nids@thinkdeterrence.com](mailto:nids@thinkdeterrence.com) to get some of your colleagues on our future invitation lists. We thank you all and hope you have a peaceful day.